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I.
PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING
The parties to this proceeding are:
James Sanchez

Plaintiff/Appellant

Martin Stern, Jr., AIA Architects
and Associates

Defendant/Respondent

Okland Construction

Defendant/Respondent

Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc.

Defendant/Respondent

Higham-Hilton Mechanical
Contractors, Inc.

Defendant/Respondent

Little America Hotel Corp., a defendant in the lower court
proceedings is not a party in this proceeding but is the
appellant in a related appeal.
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IV.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND DESCRIPTION
OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction of
this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2
(3)(i) and the Utah Constitution Article VIII, § 3.
This

is

an

appeal

from

an order

granting

summary

judgment in favor of the Defendants, which the District Court
certified pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure as a final order.

V.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, ORDINANCES. AND RULES
[N]o State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges to
immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process
of law; nor deny to any person in its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.
All political power is inherent in the people
and all free governments are founded on their
authority for their equal protection and
benefit, and they have the right to alter or
reform their government as the public welfare
may require.
Utah Const, art. I § 2.
All courts shall be open, and every person
for an injury done to him in his person,

property or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary
delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any trial in
this State, by himself or counsel, in any
civil cause to which he is a party.
Utah Const, art. I § 11.
All laws of a general
uniform operation.

nature

shall

have

Utah Const, art. I § 24.
The provisions of this Constitution are
mandatory and prohibitory unless by express
words they are declared to be otherwise.
Utah Const, art. I § 26.
Section 78-12-25.5 provides for the following:
Injury
due
to defective design or
construction of improvement to real property-Within seven years.— No action to recover
damages for any injury to property, real or
personal, or for any injury to the person, or
for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising
out of the defective and unsafe condition of
an improvement to real property, nor any
action for damages sustained on account of
such injury, shall be brought against any
person performing or furnishing the design,
planning, supervision of construction or
construction of such improvement to real
property more than seven years after the
completion of construction.
(1) "Person" shall mean an individual,
corporation, partnership, or any other legal
entity.
(2)
Completion of construction for the
purpose of this act shall mean the date of
issuance of a certificate of substantial
2

completion by the owner, architect, engineer
or other agent, or the date of the owner's
use or possession of the improvement on real
property.
The limitation imposed by this provision
shall not apply to any person in actual
possession and control as owner, tenant or
otherwise, of the improvement at the time the
defective and unsafe condition of such
improvement constitutes the proximate cause
of the injury for which it is proposed to
bring an action.
This provision shall not be construed as
extending or limiting the period otherwise
prescribed by laws of this state for the
bringing of any action.
VI.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Respondent
Builder's

Statute

contends
of

that

Repose

the

does

Utah
not

violate

Constitution provision Article I, Section 11.
Statute

of

Repose

complies

with

the

Architect's
the

and
Utah

The Builder's
requirements

of

constitutionality established in this Court's decision of Berry
v. Beech Aircraft Corp. , 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) as well as
other constitutional standards applied by courts throughout the
country.

Specifically, the statute provides an alternate remedy

to the plaintiffs

and, in the alternative, if no alternate

remedy is provided there is a clear social and economic evil to
be eliminated and the elimination of the existing legal remedy is

3

not

an

arbitrary

objective.

or

unreasonable

means

achieving

the

There never was a common law right to sue a builder

not in privity with an injured party.
Berry

by

should

be

re-examined

in

Finally, the decision in

light

of

the

due

process

requirements and the "open-court" provision.
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION X
In 1967 the Utah Legislature enacted Section 78-12-25.5
U.C.A. (1953) for the purpose of limiting liability of builders
and architects.

This statute is commonly known as a "statute of

repose" rather than a statute of limitation, in that the time
period for such a statute runs from the occurrence of some event
other than an injury that gives rise to a cause of action.

See

McGovern, "The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product
Liability Statutes of Repose," 30 Am. U.L.Rev.

579, 582-587

(1981).
As of 1981, a total of 44 architect's and contractor's
statutes

of

legislatures.

repose

have

been

passed

by

various

state

McGovern, supra at p. 587. A detailed chart of

these statutes of repose is included in Appendix II.

It should

be noted, however, that since this chart was prepared in 1981
there have been several states which have amended their statutes
and therefore a small portion of the chart is inaccurate.

1* See Appendix No. 1
4

The enactment of this large number of architect's and
builder's statutes of repose resulted from several court
decisions which greatly expanded the liability of these groups of
individuals.

Historically, courts have adhered to a requirement

of "privity of contract/" as was established in the early case of
Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Mn.W. 109, 152 Eng. Reprint 402
(1842).

In that case the court denied recovery to a third party

who, after a structure had been completed and accepted by an
owner, sought judgment against the architect and engineer for
injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the defective or
unsafe condition of the structure.
In Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, 143 N.E.2d
895 (N.Y.
privity

of

1957) the New York Court of Appeals held that the
contracts

requirement

was

untenable

and

thereby

ushered in an era in which architects and engineers were liable
to parties who were injured regardless of whether there had been
any contractual

relationship with them.

Suburban Reform Temple v. Richmond,

See Temple Sinai—

308 A.2d 508 (R.I. 1973)

(detailing the history of the demise of the privity of contract
doctrine); see also, Walsh v. Gowing, 494 A.2D 543, 546 (R.I.
1985); Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822, 825 (Colo.
1983).

5

In addition to this increased liability, the existing
statutes of limitation proved to be completely inadequate in the
building and architectural field.

As one authority noted:

Compounding the greatly expanded
liability thus thrust upon architects and
engineers in respect to third parties to whom
the architects and engineers might be liable
was the recognition that statutes of
limitation afforded little or no protection.
Such limitation period commenced, and the
action against the architect or engineer
accrued, when the third party was injured,
notwithstanding the fact that such injury
occurred many years after the design and
construction of the structure causing the
injury. . . . It is clear that under such
circumstances, not even retirement would
bring an end to an architect's or engineer's
liability.
Annotation, "Validity and
Construction, As to Claim Alleging Design
Defects, of Statute Imposing Time Limitations
Upon Action Against Architects or Engineer
for Injury or Death Arising Out of Defective
of Unsafe Condition of Improvement to Real
Property," 93 A.L.R. 3d 1242, 1246.
There are principally three areas of
statutes

of

repose

have

been

enacted.

These

law in which
include

the

architect and builder statutes, medical malpractice statutes, and
product liability statutes.

McGovern, supra at p. 587-588. A

1981 summary of the medical malpractice statutes of repose and
the product liability statutes of repose is included as Appendix
III to this Brief.

(Again, it should be noted that these charts

are not current and are for the purpose of general information
only.)
6

This Court in Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670
(Utah 1985) held that the Utah product liability statute of
repose

was

unconstitutional

because

it

violated

Article

I,

Section 11 and Article XVI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution.
In Berry a wrongful death action was maintained against the
defendants based upon negligence, strict liability and breach of
warranty.
Appellant contends that Berry conclusively establishes
that

the

architect

unconstitutional.

statute

of

repose

(Appellant's Brief, pp.

is

likewise

5-10).

Appellant

maintains that under the two-pronged test enunciated in Berry
there is no substitute remedy provided to parties claiming injury
from

building

defects

and,

further, there

is no

social or

economic evil to be eliminated with these statutes and the means
for doing so is unreasonable.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the Berry
decision and the two-pronged requirement can be satisfied by the
Utah architectural statute of repose.

A detailed analysis of

this conclusion will immediately follow this introduction.

In

addition, however, Respondent believes that this Court should reexamine its initial conclusions in Berry that Section 11 of the
Utah Constitution does not Permit the Utah Legislature to

7

limit the time period in which a cause of action may arise.

The

overwhelming majority of states that have addressed this issue
have ruled that their similar state constitutional provisions do
not prohibit a state legislature from passing a statute of repose
which

prevents

a cause

of

action

from ever arising.

This

discussion will conclude the Section 11 argument.
POINT I
THE UTAH STATUTE OF REPOSE FOR ARCHITECTS AND BUILDERS
SATISFIES THE SECTION 11 CRITERIA ESTABLISHED IN BERRY
IN THAT BOTH AN ALTERNATE REMEDY HAS BEEN PROVIDED
BY THE LEGISLATURE AND THE STATUTE ADDRESSES A CLEAR
ECONOMIC EVIL AND IS A REASONABLE MEANS FOR
ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE.
It is apparent from reading the Berry decision that the
decision was limited solely to the Utah Product Liability Act and
did not strike down all statutes of repose in other areas of law.
This Court clearly evidenced that intent when it stated:
In sum, Section 11 does not recede before
every legislative enactmentf but neither may
it be applied in a mechanical fashion to
strike every statute with which there may be
conflict.
To hold every statute of repose
unconstitutional without regard to the
legislative purpose could result in a
legislative inability to cope with widespread
social or economic evils. 717 P.2d at 680.

Under the Berry decision

a statute of repose will

satisfy Section 11 of the Constitution "if the law provides an
injured person an effective and reasonable alternative remedy 'by
8

due

course

of

law

for

interests." Id. at 680.

vindication

of

his

constitutional

This Court stated that the benefit of

this substitution must be substantially equal in value to the
remedy abrogated and must be essentially comparable to protect
one's person, property or reputation "although the form of the
substitute

remedy

may

be

different."

Jd.

Under

the

Utah

Architect and Builder Statutes of Repose an alternate remedy is
made available to an injured person as will be discussed in
subpart A of this section.
The second prong of the Berry decision states that if
there is no alternate remedy, then the statute may still be
upheld as constitutional if there is a clear social or economic
evil to be eliminated and "the elimination of an existing legal
remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving
the objective." .Id. at 680.

As will be examined in subpart B of

this section, the Legislature clearly dealt with an economic evil
and did so by a reasonable means and in a rational manner.
This conclusion is supported by the decisions of state
courts interpreting similar state constitutional provisions as
they relate to architectural and engineering statutes of repose.
Respondent has independently conducted a survey of all decided
cases

interpreting

these

statutes

and

has

summarized

decisions in Appendices IV, V, VI of this Brief.
9

these

Appendix IV is

a

chart

summarizing

the

court

decisions

relating

to

the

constitutionality of architect and builder statutes of repose.
Appendix V is a summary of the eight state decisions which have
held these types of statutes unconstitutional.

Appendix VI is a

summary of the decisions by the courts of twenty-seven states
upholding these types of statutes. A detailed analysis of these
summaries will be made throughout this Brief.
A.

The Utah Legislature has Provided an
Alternate Remedy in the Building Statute of
Repose and Therefore the Berry Criteria have
been Satisfied.
In Berry this Court addressed its previous decision

concerning
repose.

the

constitutionality

of

the building

statute of

This Court stated:
Good v. Christensen, Utah, 527 P.2d 223
(1974), sustained the constitutionality of a
seven-year statute of repose intended to
protect architects and builders. The court
observed that a person injured by a defect in
a building would still have a remedy against
an owner of the building and perhaps others.
77 P.2d at 83. (Emphasis added).
The language of the statute provides that it does not

apply "to any person in actual possession and control as owner,
tenant or otherwise, of the improvement at the time the defective
and

unsafe

condition

of

such

improvement

constituted

the

proximate cause of the injury for which it is proposed to bring
10

an action."

Thus, the statute does not apply to the owner or

tenant of a building at the time the injury occurs.

Similarly,

the statute makes no attempt to exempt the supplier of component
parts of the building.

The only exemption applies to persons who

actually design or perform the construction work of the building.
In Berry the statute of repose for product liability
contained

no

such

exemption.

That

statute, 78-15-1

U.C.A.

prevented any action from being brought against any person after
the

statutory

period

had

elapsed.

Thus

not

only was the

manufacturer exempt from liability, but all other parties in the
chain of distribution would also be exempt.
Two state supreme courts have interpreted their builder
statute of repose as allowing an alternate remedy.
Ille Electric Co., 551 P.2d 647 (Mont.
Court

held

a

ten-year

statute

of

In Reeves v.

1976) the Montana Supreme
repose

for

builders

constitutional in light of a provision similar to Section II of
Utah's Constitution and also in light of a due process clause
similar to Utah's Constitution.

The Court therein stated:

Plaintiff's fourth constitutional attack
upon Section 93-2619 is that the statute
impairs "due process" guarantees by depriving
plaintiff of a common law right without
providing a reasonable substitute.
This
argument is without merit. Section 93-2621,
R.C.M. 1947, part of the same enactment as
Section 93-2619 (Ch. 60, Laws 1971), states:
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"The limitation prescribed by this act
shall not affect the responsibility of any
owner, tenant, or person in actual
possession and control of the improvement at
the time a right of action arises."
The plain words of Section 93-2621
refute the implication of Plaintiff's
argument that he is without a remedy.
Id. at 652.
In a recent decision the Rhode Island Supreme Court
made a similar finding. In Walsh v. Gowing, 494 A.2d 543 (R.I.
19 85)

the

Supreme

Court

of

Rhode

Island

addressed

the

constitutionality of its architect's ten-year statute of repose
in light of a similar "access" and "remedy" clause in its state
constitution.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court had previously held

its product liability statute of repose unconstitutional on the
basis that it had violated the constitutional guarantee of a
"remedy

for

every

wrong"

found

in

the

state

constitution.

Kennedy v. Cumberland Engineering Co., 471 A.2d 195 (R.l.

1984).

In distinguishing the prior product liability case from
the architect case the court noted that the product liability
statute prevented a Plaintiff from suing any defendant because of
an injury caused by a defective process.

The court cited an

Illinois case which upheld its statute of repose on the basis
that, while an action for strict liability had been denied, a
negligence action still was available.
12

The court then noted that

its constitutional provision does not prevent the legislature
from changing the substance of the common law. It observed that
in a prior Rhode Island case a statute had been enacted to
protect charitable institutions from suits caused by negligence
of their employees.

The court observed that although the statute

prevented plaintiffs from suing charitable hospitals directly the
statute did not deprive the Plaintiff of their day in court.
"Instead, it left the plaintiffs with a remedy against agents or
employees of the hospital who were the initial tort feasors." Id.
at 547.
In

finding

a

similar

remedy

existed

under

the

architectural statute of repose, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
stated:
In the case before us, an improver of real
property will be subject to suit for ten
years
after its structure has been
substantially completed.
Thereafter,
Plaintiffs seeking damages can resort to the
courts for redress of injuries arising out of
improvements to real property against the
owners or operators of that improved
property. Id. at 548.
Thus, under the Utah statute, third parties who are
injured after passage of the special limitation period are not
completely without a remedy and may still pursue others, just as
has been done in the instant case.
13

See Note, "Actions Arising

Out

of

Improvements

Limitations," 57 N.D.

to

Real

L.R.

Property:

Special

Statutes

of

43, 78 (1981).

Appellant contends that the statute does not provide a
substitute remedy. (Appellant's Brief p. 18)

He acknowledges

that he may maintain his action against the landowner and tenant
as the statute provides.

The statute therefore does not cut

off the plaintiff's action as Appellant would have this Court
believe. (Appellant's Brief p. 13)
will be responsible for his damages.
limitation in this case.

The statute only defines who
There is no practical

The injured plaintiff in this case is

able to make a claim against the owner of the property for
failure to discover the alleged defect during the minimum sevenyear period or against suppliers of defective component parts.
In

addition, most

problems

dealing with

latent

defects

are

brought about by the active negligence of others.
For the preceding reasons, therefore, under the first
prong of the Berry test the Legislature did provide an alternate
remedy and the statute of repose is therefore constitutional
under Section 11 of the Utah Constitution.
B.

Assuming Arguendo That No Alternative Remedy
Has Been Provided, the Architectural
Statute of Repose Clearly Addresses an
Economic Evil and is Not an Arbitrary or
Unreasonable Means of Achieving that
Objective.

14

This Court in Berry examined in minute detail both the
proposed objectives of the Utah product liability act as well as
the effect the act would have upon such objectives,
681-683.

717 P.2d at

The Court concluded that the Utah statute of repose

"does not reasonably and substantially advance the stated purpose
of the statute." Id. at 683.
Appellant has made only minimal effort to attack the
reasons

behind

the

statute

(Appellant's Brief, pp.

of

23-28).

repose

in

building

cases.

It should be kept in mind that

it is the burden of the appellant to prove that there is a clear
and complete violation of Section 11 rights.

Simms v. Smith,

571 P.2d 586 (Utah 1977).

The appellant has a heavy burden in

seeking

the

to

overcome

constitutionality.
(1965).

statute's

presumption

El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S.

of

497, 508-509

Every rational presumption is indulged in favor of the

validity of an act of the legislature.

Enforcement of such

legislative enactment will not be refused unless its conflict
with some provision of the constitution is established beyond
reasonable doubt.

American Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co.

Commissioners of Insurance, 372 N.E.2d 520 (Mass.

1978).

v.
A

court must sustain economic legislation if it has a permissible
legislative objective and if the legislation bears a rational
relation to that objective.

"Whether [the statute is] wise or
15

effective is not, of course, the province of [courts]." Village
of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,

455 U.S.

489, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1196, 71 L.Ed. 2d 362 (1982).
The

legislative

debate

concerning

the

repose is included as Appendix VII to this Brief.
policies

enunciated

by

courts

statute

of

Several of the

in support of these types of

statutes were specifically discussed in the legislative debate;
where applicable, reference will be made to these discussions.
Numerous other reasons have been advanced by various state and
federal courts in support of these statutes.

In addition, a

review of the summaries of decisions contained in the Appendix
shows that even those states which have struck down the statute
of repose because of a classification deficiency based upon equal
protection

have

nevertheless

found

that

legitimately enacted this type of statute.

the

legislature

See, Fuiioka v. Kam,

514 P.2d 568 (Hawaii 1973); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
All

Electric,

Inc.,

660

P.2d

995,

had

1002

(Nev.

1983);

v.
(J.

Springer, dissenting); Loyal Order of Moose Lodge v. Cavaness,
563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977).
The following are policy reasons for the enactment
of statutes of repose in the building industry.

These policies

not only address the social evils being eradicated, but at the
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same time show the rational basis between the concept of statutes
of and the problems which have been created.
1.

Builders and Architects are Subjected to a Broad

Scope of Liability that Requires Limitation.
In Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co.,

382

A.2d 715 (Pa. 1976), the owner of a warehouse brought an action
against the contractors of the building to recover damages for
negligently

planning,

designing,

and

installing

material in the ceiling of the warehouse.

insulation

In sustaining the

constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court made the following statement:
It is manifestly rational to adjust time
periods for liability for acts performed
according to the substantive scope of the
liability involved. The scope of liability
of
the
class
of builders
differs
significantly from that of the class of
owners. First, the class of persons to whom
builders may be liable is larger than the
class to which owners may be liable.
Landowners may be liable to others who come
onto their land. Builders, however, may be
liable both to the landowners and the others
who use the land. Second, a builder may be
liable for construction defects under various
legal
theories--contract,
warranty,
negligence and perhaps strict liability in
tort. Landowner liability for such defects,
on the other hand, typically lies only in
tort, unless the landowner is a lessor, in
which case he is liable only for events
occurring while the tenants is in possession.
Id. at 718.
17

Several other courts, in affirming their respective
state architect and builder statutes of repose, have recognized
the increased scope of liability of builders and architects as a
reasonable ground for enactment of the statute.
Pinole,

183

Cal.

Volunteer Fire Co.
(Del.

Rptr.

881

(Cal.

See Barnhous v.

App.1982);

Cheswold

v. Lambertson Construction Co., 489 A.2d 413

1984); Beecher v. White, 447 N.E.2d 622

(Ind.

App.

1983); and Lamb v. Wedaewood South Corp. , 302 S.E.2d 868 (N.C.
1983).
2. It is Rational to Limit the Liability of Builders
and Architects, Since They Have No Control Over the Building
After Relinquishing it to the Owners.
Generally, after the owner of a structure accepts the
finished product the builder has no right to control the number
and type of persons entering the land or regulate the condition
of entry.
is

a

Following acceptance of the completed structure, there

possibility

mishandling,

of

improper

neglect,

abuse,

modification,

and

poor

maintenance,

unskilled

repair.

Neither the architect nor the builder has any opportunity to make
ongoing inspections, as the owner does.
Such distinctions have been recognized and accepted by
numerous courts

in sustaining

the constitutionality

of their

respective state architect's and builder's statutes of repose.
18

See, Barnhous. supra,: Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp,, 655 P.2d
822 (Colo.

1982); Cheswold Volunteer Fire Co.

Construction Co.,: 489 A.2d 413 (Del.

v. Lambertson

1984); Mullis v. Southern

Company Services, Inc., 296 S.E.2d 579 (1982); Beecher v. White,
447 N.E.2d 622 (Ind.

App.

1983); Bermaster v. Gravity Drainage

District, 366 S.2d 1381 (La.
(N.M.

App.

1977)i and Freezer Storage, Inc.

Co., 382 A.2d 715 (Pa.
3.

1978); Howell v. Burk, 568 P.2d 214
v. Armstrong Cork

1976).

Statistically, a Seven-Year Period in Which to

Bring an Action Against Builders and Architects Will Encompass
Almost All Claims That Will Arise.
The overwhelming majority of claims brought against
design and building professionals are brought within seven years
of completion of construction.

In testimony before the House

District Committee, a representative
which provides professional

of an insurance company

liability insurance to architects

offered statistical data showing the percentage of claims brought
in given years after completion of a project.

This information

is included as Appendix VIII to this Brief and was based upon 570
random pending suits against architects.
H.R.

6678 and H.R.

Hearing on H.R. 6527,

11544 before Sub-Committee No. 1 of the

House Committee on the District of Columbia, 90th Cong., 1st
Session 28 (1967).

The table indicates that by the end of the
19

seventh year after a project has been completed 97.9% of all
claims have been asserted.
One commentator noted this probability by stating:
If an accident or damage related to the
services performed by the architect or
builder were to occur, it most likely would
occur either during construction or within a
relatively short period of time after
completion of the structure.
After that
time, injuries or damages are most likely to
be the result of improper maintenance on the
part of the owner or occupier, or other
factors over which architects and builders
have no control. Collins, C.H., "Limitation
of Action Statutes for Architects and
B u i l d e r s — An
Examination
of
Constitutionality,"
29 Federation of
Insurance Counsel Quarterly, 41, 49 (1978).
During the discussion concerning the passage of the
Utah bill; Representative Hill made the following statement:
We feel that there is a time testing of
the design capabilities of the design that
has been furnished, and if there are any
major errors or omissions, the team of the
designer, the owner and the contractor should
be able to uncover any major ones, such as
you are all familiar with, the ones
concerning the Savings & Loan Building on
Main Street •
The error there in the
combination of things that entered into it
showed up immediately because they had some
beam failures.
This type of thing, the
figure or main thing that the seven-year
period is a time test of anything that could
be of significance.
There might be some
minor, I don't think any of us are perfect.
When you say that anything would be perfect
after passing a seven-year period, but we
feel that the seven-year time test is
20

adequate to protect the public in this case
and give repose and relief to the peaceful
attitude of the designer who knows not now
he's held forever for that design and can be
brought in as part of the suit should one
occur. Transcript of testimony before House,
pp. 13-14, Appendix VIII.
See also, Shibuya v. Architects Hawaii, Ltd., 647 P.2d
276, 283 (Hawaii, 1982); Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d
822 (Colo.

1982); Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514, 521 (Mass.

1982); Lamb v. Wedoewood South Corp., 302 S.E.2d 868, 882 (N.C.,
1983); McCulloch v. Fox & Jacob, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex.
App.

1985).
4. Because Buildings May Last for Literally Hundreds of

Years a Limitation is Needed to Eliminate Perpetual Liability on
the Part of Builders and Architects,
During the House and Senate discussions concerning the
bill the following statement was made by Representative Hill:
The work that an engineer, an architect
or contractor or supervisor performs by
statute can be held against him for his
entire life, and in some cases, have been
brought against the estate of the man after
he is deceased. . . . In this particular
matter we have, it has been brought to our
attention across the nation that it seems
like we become a sue-conscious people to the
extent that when an action is brought
everyone that had any connection with it,
even sometimes down to the janitor, have been
entered into as a party to the suit. This
has been true of many engineering firms and
many engineering and architectural people
21

where action has been brought years and years
after they have completed their service, the
facility has been in use and a cause for at
least proposed negligence has been brought
and the person who is responsible for the
construction of the building in the original
instance has been named as a party to the
suit.
Usually these have been able to be
cleared but not until much time and energy
has been expended on the part of that person
that was responsible for the design. House
Hearings, pp. 5-6, Appendix VIII.
Senator Buckner during the Senate hearings concerning
the bill made a similar comment.

He stateds

Utah statutes today include some fifty or
more laws that are of a limitation nature
covering broad groups of action.
However,
there is no specific statute offering
reasonable protection of building industry,
contractors, subcontractors, suppliers,
engineers or architects and they are now
liable basically for a lifetime for these
actions that we have been talking about. An
action alleging liability for personal injury
or building defects can be brought by five,
ten, twenty, thirty, fifty, to one hundred
years after the building basically has been
completed.
In the interest of the twentyfive year old building, most of those
involved with the design and construction,
could be deceased or retired, if retired, and
they can be completely innocent. They must,
however, go through the expense of defending
any action to prove their innocence at the
time. Transcript of Hearing, p. 17.
This problem is further illustrated in testimony given
before the United States House of Representatives in support of
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House Bill No. 4181.

In a House report the following statements

were made concerning the perpetual liability issue:
At hearings before your Committee,
specific cases were mentioned to illustrate
the need for the Pending legislation. In one
case an architectural firm designed an
auditorium which was built in 1928.
In
1965, a visitor to the auditorium fell on the
stairway and was injured. Her allegations in
a suit for damages against the owner was that
her injury was due to the improper location
of the handrail. The owner of the building,
in turn, filed suit against the architect for
alleged negligence in designing the stairway
and handrail. Thus, thirty-eight years after
the completion of the construction the
architectural firm is now defending itself
against a $50,000 lawsuit.
In another instance an engineering firm
designed a grain elevator which was built in
1934.
The elevator was destroyed by an
explosion in 1957. In 1959, the owner sued
the engineer for $250,000, alleging that the
explosion was due to errors in the design of
the ventilation system.
In the first case, none of the
architects involved in the design of the
auditorium
is alive today but the
architectural firm is being sued.
Hearing
before
the United
States House of
Representatives—H.R. Bill No.
4181, House
Report No.
91-370 as quoted in Grissom v.
North American Aviation, Inc., 326 F. Supp.
465, 467-8 (D.Fla. 1971).
The

Supreme

Court

of Nevada

in State Farm Fire &

Casualty v. All Electric, Inc., 660 P.2d 995 (Nev. 1983) stated
in relation to the Nevada statute of repose that the builder
23

statute's placing of a time limitation on the potential liability
of designers and contractors "is clearly carrying out a proper
and legitimate legislative purpose, namely, keeping such persons
from remaining potentially liable for the lifetime of a building
or for their own lifetime." Id. at 1001.
5.

Suits Involving Buildings Built Many Years Prior to

Injury Create a Substantial Burden of Proof Upon the Defendants
in Order to Defend Stale Claims Asserted Against Them.
During

the

discussions

concerning

the

bill

Representative Hill told the House of Representatives:
Now the fact that at some time the cut
off should be is recognized also in the court
because in some instances, in any kind of a
suit, if the matter is too long past, they
will dismiss it because it is a stale case.
Witnesses, memories, records are so far in
the time past that it is difficult to
establish testimony, to establish some of the
things that might be necessary for a court
determination in these, and these have been
dismissed on this fact because they ruled
there had been as a matter of equity in
justice no attempt to rule on those. House
Hearings, P. 6, Appendix VII.
The difficulty in maintaining records and witnesses was
also

noted

legislative

by

the

history

Hawaii
of

Supreme

Court

in

its statute of repose

reviewing

the

in Shibuva v.

Architects Hawaii, Ltd., 647 P.2d 276, 283 (Hawaii 1982).

The

committee

and

found

that

with

claims
24

involving

architects

engineers records get lost with the passage of time so that the
basis for a defense becomes cloudy and witnesses often die or
move away.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Rosenberg v. Town

of North Bergen, 293 A.2d 662, 667-68 (N.J.

1972) stated:

There comes a time when [the defendant]
ought to be secure in his reasonable
expectation that the slate has been wiped
clean of ancient obligations, and he ought
not to be called on to resist a claim when
evidence has been lost, memories have faded,
witnesses have disappeared.
The Colorado Supreme Court noted this same problem when
it stateds
After such a long delay, as in this
case, the proof problems in defending a
negligence action of this kind would be very
difficult to surmount.
For example, the
standards for architectural performance as
well as building codes in effect could have
changed significantly in the intervening
years, and it would be difficult to establish
the standard of care of a reasonably prudent
architect at the time the design services
were rendered in the late 1950 's. See,
Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M.
688, 568 P.2d 214
(1977). These problems, in our view, support
the reasonableness of the legislative action.
We are not unmindful of the fact that these
delays also impose proof problems on the
party asserting liability, but nevertheless
the legislature is free to set reasonable
restrictions so long as constitutional
requirements are met.
Yarbro v.
Hilton
Hotels Corp. . 655 P.2d 822, 826, fn.
5
(Colo. 1983) .
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Similarly, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico in Howell
v. Burk. 568 P.2d 214 (N.M. 1977) recognized this problem when it
stated:
While both those covered and those not
covered by the statute may be exposed to
claims years after the construction project
was completed, there is a difference in the
problems
of
defending
such claims.
Architectural plans may have been discarded,
copies of building codes in force at the time
of construction may no longer be in
existence, persons individually involved in
the construction project may be deceased or
may not be located.
Due to the lapse of
time, those persons covered by the statute
may find it impossible to assert a reasonable
defense. Id. at 220.
6.

Due

to the Unique Nature of the

Construction

Industry and the Need to Promote Improvements to Real Property,
Builders and Architects Warrant Special Protection Under the Law.
In Salinero v. Pon, 177 Cal. Rptr. 204

(Cal. App.

1981) the court recognized two interrelated legitimate purposes
to be achieved by architect's and builder's statutes of repose.
First, the court noted that a contractor is in the business of
constructing improvements and must devote his entire capital to
that end.

Therefore, the need to provide reserves against an

uncertain liability extending indefinitely into the future can
seriously

impinge

upon

the

conduct
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of

the

contractor

and

adversely affect the construction industry.

In addition, the

court noted:
The statutory
limitation
precluding liability for patent defect after
a period of four years from the date of
substantial completion of improvement to real
property can be said to promote such
construction since it frees those associated
with it from the specter of lawsuits in the
distant future.
Those who fear venturing
into such activity will be less deterred when
a ceiling is placed on the period for which
they can be held liable.
The concept of
promoting construction tends to harmonize
with the public Policy favoring the full
enjoyment and use of real Property . . . . We
conclude that the subject statute
promotes a recognized legitimate state
interest by protecting contractors from
uncertain
future
liability,
thereby
encouraging construction, and that a rational
basis therefore exists . . Id. at 208.
The Supreme Court of Colorado

in Yarbro v. Hilton

Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822, 828 also recognized that this type of
legislation can encourage innovation and experimentation.
court stated:
The Legislature could also have
reasonably concluded that a statute limiting
liability of architects, engineers, and other
design professionals providing desirable
services to improvements to real estate,
might reasonably encourage innovation and
experimentation.
"Innovations are usually accompanied by
some unavoidable risk.
Design creativity
might be stifled if architects and engineers
labored under the fear that every untried
27

The

configuration might have unsuspected flaws
that could lead to liability decades later."
O'Brien v. Hazelet and Erdall, 299 N.W.2d
336, 342 (Mich. 1980).
Finally, as noted by a Senate committee in Hawaii, the
longer the statutory period, the harder it becomes to distinguish
between negligence in design or construction and negligence in
maintenance.

Shibuya v. Architects Hawaii, Ltd., 647 F.2d 276,

283 (Hawaii 1982).
7.

Courts of Numerous States Have Found that the

Preceding Policy Reasons Constitute an Economic or Social Evil
and

That

the

Statute

of

Repose

is

a

Reasonable

thye judicial

survey

conducted

Means

for

Achieving the Objective.
Xu

by

Respondent

as

contained in Appendices IV, V, and VI of this Brief, courts from
thirty-three states have decided the constitutionality of these
types of statutes of repose.

There are presently eight states in

which the last decision of the highest court or an intermediate
court has held a statute of repose for architects and builders to
be unconstitutional.

See Alabama, Hawaii, Kentucky, Nevada,

South Carolina, South Dakota and Wyoming.

Of the eight states

which presently have struck down their statutes, only three have
done so under an open court or remedy provision which is similar
to that of Section 11 in the Utah Constitution.
South Dakota, and Wyoming.

See Alabama,

The remaining states have invalidated
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their respective statutes based upon equal protection clauses
(see cases from Hawaii, Nevada, and South Carolina) or upon a
prohibition against local and special legislation (See Kentucky).
The legislatures of seven of these eight states have
amended the statutes that were declared unconstitutional.

Only

Alabama has failed to amend its statute subsequent to a 1983
decision invalidating the statute.
thus

far

has

been

held

None of the amended statutes

unconstitutional

by

any

decisions

subsequent to the original decision requiring the amendment.

Of

these eight states, the Supreme Courts of Hawaii, Nevada, and
Oklahoma all stated that the statutes did not violate due process
and

that

they

legislation.

constituted

legitimate

state

objectives

in

Only the Supreme Court of Alabama in Jackson v.

Mannesman Demag Corp., 435 So.2d 725 (Ala. 1983) held that there
was no substantial relationship between the statute of repose and
the eradication of the social evil it was directed against.
The scarcity of decisions striking down these types of
statutes, together with the efforts of the state legislatures to
amend them in order to comply with the court requirements, shows
a strong judicial and legislative attitude in favor of these
types of statutes.
On the affirmative side of the statutes of repose,
there have been twenty-seven state court decisions upholding the
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validity of the architect and builder statutes of repose in their
respective states.

Of this number, twenty-five have upheld it

against attacks by federal and state due process and state open
court and remedy provisions.

(It should be noted that the state

"open court—access-remedy" provisions are very similar to state
and federal due Process arguments.) Hartford Fire Ins.

Co.

v.

Lawrence, Dykes. Goodenberq, Bower & Clancy, 740 F.2d 1362, 1367
(6th Cir.

1984); Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670,

679 (Utah 1985); McGovern, supra, at 613.
The

following

states

have

specifically

upheld

architect's and builder's statutes of repose in relation to state
constitutional

provisions

similar to Section

11 of the Utah

Constitution, in terms of access to the court and remedies:
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
and Texas.
Several states have upheld the statutes of repose on
due

process

arguments

nearly

identical

constitutional access and remedy arguments.

to

the

state

Those states which

have relied exclusively upon due process and not upon the open
court or remedy provision are as follows: California, Illinois,
Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Wisconsin.
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States which

have

upheld

the

statutes

on equal protection

grounds

alone

without ruling upon due process or access and remedy clauses are
Arkansas and Washington.
It would serve no useful purpose to quote extensively
from these numerous opinions, since the summary contained in the
Appendix herein attached adequately describes the basis of each
opinion.

However, several quotations from leading cases are

helpful in supporting Respondent's argument that these types of
statutes have a legitimate purpose and a rational basis.
The Indiana Court of Appeals in Beecher v. White, 447
N.E.2d 622 (Ind. App. 1983) stated:
The
reading
of
the
voluminous
authorities presented to us in most able
briefs by both sides has impressed upon us
this fact: the very fury of the debate
between the courts of last resort of at least
twenty-seven states, as well as some federal
c o u r t s , militates
in favor of the
reasonableness of classification. In view of
the fact that so many of the courts in other
jurisdictions
have
upheld
the
constitutionality
of the acts as a
permissible classification, it would be
intellectual arrogance on our part to
classify the act of our own Legislature as
manifestly unreasonable or arbitrary. We are
in an area where reasonable men differ on the
wisdom of the law. The arguments presented
in the cases upholding the constitutionality
of these statutes are equally applicable
here.
The clear trend of the decision
upholds such statutes. Our own Supreme Court
has upheld similar statutes governing product
liability and malpractice, and we believe
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these cases indicate the correct result here.
Id, at 627.
In Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514, 524 (Mass-

1982)

the Supreme Court of Massachusetts made the following statement:
The Legislature could have rationally
concluded that it was proper to place
different time limits on the liability of
builders from those placed on persons in
possession or control as owner, tenant, or
otherwise. . . . Further, the Legislature
could have reasonably concluded that it is
appropriate to limit the liability only of
architects and engineers and other design
professionals. A limit on liability may be
necessary to encourage those professionals to
experiment with new designs and materials. .
. . Finally, it is well recognized that "when
legislative authority is exerted within a
proper area, it need not embrace every
conceivable problem within that field. The
Legislature may proceed one step at a time,
addressing itself to the phase of the problem
which seems most acute to the legislative
mind." Id.
The Supreme Court of Oregon, in upholding its ten-year
statute of repose, found that the Legislature had exercised a
proper

function

litigation.

in

limiting

these

types

of

actions

The Court stateds

It has always been considered a proper
function of legislatures to limit the
availability of causes of action by the use
of statutes of limitation so long as it is
done for the purpose of protecting a
recognized public interest.
It is in the
interest of the public that there be a
definite end to the possibility of future
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from

litigation resulting from past actions. It
is a permissible constitutional legislative
function to balance the possibility of
outlawing legitimate claims against the
public need that at some definite time there
be an end to potential litigation. Joseph v.
Burns, 491 P.2d 203, 208 (Or- 1971).
In conclusion, this Court should hold that the remedyand-access clause of the Utah Constitution is not offended by the
architect's

and

builder's

statute

of

repose.

The

statute

provides an alternate remedy to an injured party by allowing that
party

to

sue

the

owner

or

other

party

in possession.

In

addition, the statute is clearly designed to correct an economic
and social evil of perpetual liability to building professionals.
The utilization of the seven-year statute of repose is
not unreasonable, and in fact is a reasonable means for achieving
the

sought-after

objective.

This

Court,

therefore,

should

affirm the lower court's judgment.
POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD RE-EXAMINE THE BERRY
DECISION REGARDING THE ABILITY OF THE
LEGISLATURE TO REGULATE THE TIME A CAUSE
OF ACTION ARISES
This Court in Berry decision rejected the principle
that until a cause of action has vested, the Legislature is free
to create a new cause of action or abolish old ones to attain
permissible legislative objectives.
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This Court stated:

The statute, according to the [New
Jersey] court, merely defines the time during
which a cause of action exists.
By
definition, then, when that time expires, no
cause of action exists and none is therefore
abrogated. The injured party simply has no
cause of action, and the injury done him is
damnum absque injuria.
We reject this view because it begs the
question.
The question, in our view, is
whether there is a remedy by due course of
law, and that question is not answered by
arguing that a cause of action is not
abrogated but is only defined to be
temporally limited. In short, constitutional
protection cannot be evaded by the semantic
argument that a cause of action is not cut
off but only defined to exist for a specific
period of time. 717 P.2d at 679.
Respondent

is

unaware

of

the

arguments

that

were

presented in the Berry case relating to the vesting of rights
under open court provisions.

The New Jersey case, for example,

referred to by the court Rosenberg v. Town of North

Bergen, 293

Ac 2d 662 (N.J. 1972) did not involve the interpretation of an
open court provision.

There are numerous other decisions, not

cited by the court, which correctly address this exact issue.
Respondent would suggest that this court should reexamine its position in the Berry case in light of a large
number of cases decided by other courts which hold that the
"access" and "remedy" provisions of state constitutions do not
prohibit a legislature from eliminating a cause of action before
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it vests. As the Appendix attached herein shows, eighteen states
have interpreted their open court provisions on the basis that
the legislature is empowered to abolish common law causes of
action in order to attain a permissible legislative objective,
and that no vested property right exists in a plaintiff until the
actual

injury

occurs.

See, Appendices

decisions in the following eighteen states:
Indiana,

Louisiana,

Massachusetts,

IV, V,

and VI

for

Colorado, Delaware,

Michigan,

Minnesota,

Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin.
These principles
quotations

have been stated in the following

from three representatives

courts.

The Louisiana

Supreme Court in Bermaster v. Gravity Drainage District No. 2,
366 So.2d 1381 (La. 1978) stated the following:
Where an injury has occurred for which
the injured party has a cause of action, such
cause of action is a vested property right
which is protected by the guarantee of due
process. See, Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S.
326, 332, 54 S.Ct. 140, [142], 78 L.Ed. 342
(1933); Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124,
132, 1 S.Ct. 102, [108] 27 L.Ed. 104 (1882).
However, where the injury has not yet
occurred and that cause of action has not yet
vested, the guarantee of due process does not
forbid the creation of new causes of action
or the abolition of old ones to attain
permissible legislative objectives.
See,
Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S.
117, 122, 50
S.Ct.
57 [58], 74 L.Ed.
21 (1929).
Our
jurisprudence has recognized the validity of
legislative regulation of causes of action,
35

including replacement and even abolition,
that one person may have against another for
personal injuries. Id. at 1387-1388.
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Lamb v. Wedgewood
South

Corp.,

302

interpretation of

S.E.2d
a similar

868

(N.C.

1983)

"remedy" provision

explained

of the state

constitution s
[T]he Legislature has not absolutely
abolished all claims against builders and
designers arising out of improvements they
built or designed.
Rather, it has
established a time period beyond which such
claims may not be brought even if the injury
giving rise to the claim does not occur until
the time period has elapsed.
We are confident that this condition to
the legal cognizability of a claim does not
violate the constitutional guarantee that for
every "injury done" there shall be a
"remedy".
The "remedy" constitutionally
guaranteed "for an injury done" is qualified
by the words "by due course of law. " This
means that the remedy constitutionally
guaranteed must be one that is legally
cognizable. The Legislature has the power to
define the circumstances under which a remedy
is legally cognizable and those under which
it is not.
"The General Assembly is the
policy making agency of our government, and
when it elects to legislate in respect to the
subject matter of any common law rule, the
statute supplants the common law rule and
becomes the public policy of the state in
respect
to that particular
matter.
McMichael v. Proctor, 243 N.C. 479, 483, 91
S.E.2d 231, 234 (1956). Id. at 882.
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its

The Supreme Court of North Carolina then continued
concerning a cause of action and the vesting of that cause.

It

stated:
Furthermore, since plaintiff's cause of
action had not accrued at the time this
legislation was passed, no vested right is
involved. "[N]o person has a vested right in
a continuance of the common or statute law.
. . . Pinkham v. Unborn Children of Jather
Pinkham, 227 N.C. 72, 78, 40 S.E.2d 690, 694
(1946).
'[A] right cannot be considered a
vested right unless it is something more than
such a mere expectancy as may be based upon
an anticipated continuance of the present
law. . .'" IcL. at 79, 40 S.E.2d at 695
(quoting Cooley's Constitutional Limitations,
Vol. II, p. 749); see also, Duke Power v.
Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.. 438
U.S. 59, 88, m. 32, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2638,
n. 32, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978). We conclude,
therefore, that the statute does not violate
Article I, Section 18, of our State's
Constitution. Id. at 882-883.
Finally, the Pennsylvania
Storage, Inc.

Supreme

Court

in Freezer

v. Armstrong Cork Co., 382 A.2d 715, 721 (Pa.

1978) stated this principle:
This Court would encroach upon the
Legislature's
ability to guide
the
development of the law if we invalidated
legislation simply because the rule enacted
by the Legislature rejects some cause of
action currently preferred by the court. To
do so would be to place certain rules of the
"common law" and certain non-constitutional
decisions of courts above all change except
by constitutional amendment. Such a result
would offend our notion of the checks and
balances between the various branches of
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government, and of the flexibility required
for the healthy growth of the law.
The preceding cases all stand for the proposition that
under the open court Provision of the State Constitution the
Legislature

can

entirely

abrogate

a

common

law

right

and

therefore may certainly provide that a particular cause of action
can no longer arise unless it accrues within a specified period
of time.
(Micho

O'Brien v. Hazlett and Erdal, 299 N.w.2d 336, 341

1980) •

And while the constitution guarantees a "remedy

by due course of law" for "an injury done", state law "determines
what injuries are recognized and what remedies are available."
Hartford Fire Ins.

Co.

v. Lawrence, Dykes, Goodenberger, Bower

and Clancy, 740 F.2d 1362, 1370 (6th Cir,

1984.)

Under the analysis utilized by the courts cited in the
Appendix, it would be unnecessary for this Court to apply the
two-pronged test developed in Berry since this test is only
applied

by

courts which

do

not

recognize the right of the

legislature to eliminate causes of action which are not vested.
Respondent suggests that this court re-examine its position in
Berry

with

regard

to

the

open

Constitution.
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court

provisions

of

the

POINT III
THE STATUTE OF REPOSE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION OR THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
POINT A
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
In

analyzing

this

case

with

respect

to the equal

protection clause of the Utah Constitution or the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, this Court should
apply the rational basis test.
herein are economical.
money damages.

The rights asserted by Plaintiff

The prayer of their complaint asks for

This court in the case of Malan v. Lewis. 693

P.2d 661 (Utah 1984), determined that in an action for personal
injuries, the level of review should utilize the rational basis
test.

The Court stated at page 670:
"Whether a statute meets equal protection
standards depends in the first instance upon
the objective of the statute and whether the
classifications established provide a
reasonable basis for promoting those
objectives."
This minimum level of review was again applied in the

case of Mountain Fuel Supply v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 884
(Utah 1988) because of the economic nature of the claim asserted
by the Plaintiff.
This Court should therefore apply the rational basis
test in analyzing the statute of repose with respect to equal
39

protection

laws guaranteed by the Utah Constitution

and the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
POINT B
THE CLASSIFICATIONS CREATED BY THE STATUTE OF
REPOSE ARE REASONABLE AND ARE REASONABLY RELATED
TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A LEGITIMATE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE
For
Respondent
statute

the

reasons

asserted

asserts

that

the

repose

are

reasonable.

of

reasonably

related

to

the

in

Point

classifications

IB,

of

the

by

the

they

are

created

Furthermore,

achievement

1-7

the

legitimate

legislative purpose (See, Appendix VIII)
Other Courts across the Country when presented with the
equal protection argument have upheld the statute.

In the case

of Carter v. Hartenstein, 455 S.W.2d 918 (Ark. 1970) the court
sustained

a

protection

clause

Federal

statute
of

Constitution

of

repose

and

found

the State Constitution
had

not

been violated

that

the

equal

as well as the
by

limiting

the

classes of individuals subject to the protection of the statute.
The Carter decision was appealed to the United States Supreme
Court,

which

question.

dismissed

for

401 U.S. 901 (1971).

want

of

a

substantial

federal

Numerous courts have equated the

dismissal for lack of a federal question with a decision on the
merits.

Hartford Fire Insurance v. Lawrence, 740 F.2d 1362, 1366

(6th Cir. 1984).
40

The Washington Supreme Court in the case of Yakima
Fruit and Gold Storage Company v. Central Heating and Plumbing
Company,

503

P. 2d

108

(Wash.

1973) upheld

attack upon the 6 year statute of repose.

a

constitutional

The court failed to

recognize Appellant's equal protection argument and found that
the statute did not violate the equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution.

The court further relied upon the

Oregon Supreme Court case of Joseph v. Burns, 491 P.2d 203 (Or.
1971).
The Respondents agree that a few courts have struck
down builders statutes of repose as cited in Appellant's Brief at
page 25.

Those courts, however, did not determine the issue

based upon whether or not the classification bore a reasonable
relationship to the achievement of the legitimate legislative
purpose.

The Hawaii Supreme Court in the case of Shibuya v.

Architects Hawaii Ltd, 647 P.2d 276 stated a page 286
"We are reminded, of course, that a court
should 'not substitute its view of wise or
fair legislative policy for that of the duly
elected representative of the people.'"
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, at 243,
101 S.C. 1074, at 1087, 67 L.Ed.2.d 186
(1981).
(Powell J. Dissenting), "thus, we
hesitate to declare the legislation at issue
is constitutionally infirm on grounds that
it does not further legitimate state
objectives."
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The Hawaii Court in Shibuya determined that the question to be
answered is whether

"All persons similarly circumstanced have

been treated alike."

Id. at 286.

In this particular case, Appellant asserts in their
brief at page 33 "If Sanchez wins a substantial verdict against
Little America, fully compensating his injuries, there is no need
to appeal the lower court's dismissal.
moot."

Sanchez's claim would be

Appellants therefore recognize that the full extent of

their claim can be recovered against the owner of the property,
Little America.

In so doing, the Appellant acknowledges that the

right of action has not been diminished.

Appellant's also make

no assertion that other plaintiffs in any other circumstances
would be treated differently then that of the Appellant.

In so

doing, Appellant further recognizes that "all persons similarly
circumstanced have been treated alike."
Hawaii Ltd,

Shibuya v. Architect's

647 P.2d 276, 286, (Hawaii 1982).

This

Court

in

applying

therefore

concluded,

as

the

appellant

courts

vast

the

rational

majority

of

basis

should

other

states

have, that the statute of repose does not

violate the equal protection clause of the Utah Constitution or
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN CERTIFYING THIS CASE
FOR APPEAL
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Respondent

agree

with

Appellant's

assertion

that

"before the lower court can certify the claim for appeal it must
make three findings:
1.
2.

There must be multiple claims for relief,
The Judgment appealed from must have been entered

in an order that would be appealable, but for the fact that other
claims or parties remained in the action; and
3.

There must be a finding that there is no just

reason for delay of the appeal•

(See, Appellant's Brief, p. 31-

32)
Appellant claims that elements one and two are present
in the case, but element three is not*

Appellant's Brief p. 32

The Respondents assert that there was no just reason for delay of
the appeal and that is why the request was made to Judge Young to
certify the matter as a final order.
Plaintiff

has

filed

separate

and

In this particular case,

distinct

causes

against Respondent, Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc.
Amended Complaint, paragraphs 83-94).

of

action

(See, Second

The entry of the Order of

Summary Judgment by the lower court completely extinguished all
the claims against this Respondent.

Judge Young determined that

there would be no just reason to make this Respondent wait around
for possibly years to determine whether or not Sanchez wins a
substantial verdict against Little America fully compensating him
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for his injuries •

It is also possible that Sanchez could be

determined by a jury to be 100% negligent. In this case, as his
testimony clearly showed, he knew how deep the pool was and that
a reasonably prudent person would not have dived into the pool in
his condition.
It also seems appropriate that this matter be resolved
in one action as there presently is an appeal pending before this
case with respect to a third-party action brought by Little
America Hotel against Okland Construction Company.

It would

certainly be inappropriate to require Respondent, Rocky Mountain
Pools, Inc. to wait for Plaintiff to resolve their claims with
Little America to have this matter determined by the Supreme
Court, especially when this Court is now reviewing another Order
from the District Court in this same case.
In

this

case, Judge

determined in his discretion
delay."
1984).

Young

reviewed

the

facts and

"that there is no just reason for

Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765 at 767 (Utah
This Court would have to find that there was an abuse of

discretion

in order to overturn Judge Young's certification.

The Supreme Court of the United States stated in Sears, Roebuck
Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437, 76 S.Ct. 895, 900-01 100 L.Ed.
1297 (1957)
The District Court cannot, in the exercise of
its discretion, treat as "final" that which
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is not "final".... But the District Court
may, by the exercise of its discretion in the
interest of sound judicial administration,
release for appeal final decisions upon one
or more, but less than all, claims in
multiple claims actions. The timing of such
release is, with good reason, vested by the
rule primarily in the discretion of the
District Court as the one most likely to be
familiar with the case and with any
justifiable reasons for delay. With equally
good reason, any abuse of that discretion
remains reviewable by the Court of Appeals,
(emphasis in original)
To require the Respondent, Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc.
to wait around for however long it might take the Plaintiff to
proceed, would be unjust and therefore Judge Young's ruling,
pursuant to Rule 54B was appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Utah

Code,

Section

78-12-25.5

Plaintiff of their cause of action.

does

not

deprive

In fact, Plaintiff admits

that if they win a substantial verdict against Little America,
there will be no need to proceed against the other Defendants.
The statute of repose therefore does not completely eliminate
Plaintiff's claims, it only transfers the liability of such claim
to the owner of the building.
In

this

particular

case,

Corporation can certainly withstand
rendered

in

favor

of

Little

America

any verdict

that may be

Plaint iff/Appellant.
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Hotel

The

Plaintiff/Appellant

has

not

been

unfairly

treated

nor

discriminated against as all persons in his class are treated
equally as required by the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
there is a strong

It is clear that

legislative desire to enact this type of

socially desirable legislation.
The order was properly certified by Judge Young as a
final order in that it would unfair and unjust to require Rocky
Mountain Pools, Inc. to continue in the defense of this matter
pending the outcome of Plaintiff's case against Little America
Hotel.
This Court should, therefore, affirm the dismissal of
Plaintiff's cause of action against Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of April, 1989.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

attorney for Respondent
Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc.
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1. Tort, contract, or otherwise, including actions for contribution or indemnity.
2. Any deficiency in the design, planning, supervision, or observation of construct ion of such
aa improvement; or injury to real or penonzl property caused bv anv such deficiency; or injury to
or wrongful death of a person caused by any such deficiency. (Designated hereinafter as GEN)
3. Substantial completion.
4. No defense for persons in actual possession or control of such improvement, such as owner
tenant, or otherwise.
5. Contract (oral or written, sealed or unsealed), tort, or otherwise.
6. Stt note 2 smpm.
7. Substantial completion.
8. Six years generally, but in case of injury to property or person or injury causing wrongful
death, which occurred during sixth vear after substantial completion, ton action may be brought
within two years after date injurv occurred, but in no event more than eight yean after substantial
completion.
9. Set note 4 supm.
10. Contract (oral or written, sealed or unsealed) for property damage; tort or contract for
personal injury or wrongful death.
11. General statutory provisions do not specify defendants, but surveyors and persons doing
engineering or architectural work are specifically mentioned as being included in a subsequent
section.
12. See note 2 *upm>
13. Substantial completion.
14. Five-year limitation for contract action for property damage; four-year limitation for ton
or contract action for personal injury or wrongfai death. In case of personal injury or injury
causing wrongful death that occurred dunng third year after substantial completion, action may be
brought within one year after date of injury, not to extend more than five years after substantial
completion. Time cannot be extended bv contract among the parties.
15. Statute is tolled in the event of fraudulent concealment; no defense for person in actual
possession or control; and no action permitted against anyone who furnishes designs or plans not
used within three yean of furnishing.
16. Includes surety of person in cases of latent defects.
17. Both latent or patent deficiency in design, specifications, surveying, planning, supervision
or observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to, or survey of, real property,
injury to property, real or personal, arising out of either latent or patent denciencv; and injury to
person or wrongful death arising out of a patent deficiency.
18. Substantial completion.
19. Four-vear limitation for patent deficiency; ten-vear limitation for latent deficiency. (Ton
action may be brought within one year after date of injury arising out of patent defect that occun
during the fourth vear after such substantial completion, irrespective of the date of death, but not
to exceed five vean after substantial completion).
20. Latent deficiency provisions do not apply to willful misconduct or fraudulent
concealment. See note 4 JIUWW, which applies to both patent and latent deficiencies. Patent
deficiency provisions do not apply to owner-occupied single-unit residences.
21. Architect, contractor, engineer, or inspector.
22. Injury to person or property caused bv design, planning, supervision, inspection,
construction, or observation of construction of any improvement to real property.
23. Statute of limitation commences when claim for relief arises. Statute of repose
commences upon substantial completion, which is defined as decree of completion at which the
owner can conveniently utilize the improvement for the intended purpose.
24. Within two vean after claim arises, not to exceed ten yean after substantial completion.
(If injury to person or property occun dunng tenth vear after substantial completion, action may
be brought within one year after date of injury).
25. See note 4 rupr*
26. Contract, tort, or otherwise (includes action for con tn but ion or indemnity).
27. Architect or professional engineer.
28. See note 2 sue**
29. Substantial completion (either when first used or when first available for use, whichever
occun first).
30. Seven yean generally, but eight yean after substantial completion when case involves
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injury to property or penonai injury causing wrongful death, which injury occurred dunng seventh
year alter substantial completion.
31. See note 4 supra.
32. Contract (oral or written, sealed or unsealed), ton, or otherwise
33 Deficiency in construction or manner of construction of improvement to real property
and/or m designing, planning, supervision and/or observation of such construction, injury to
property, real, personal, or mixed, arising out of anv deiiaency, personal injuries arising out of
deficiency, wrongful death arising out of deficiency, trespass arising out of deficiency; injury
unaccompanied with force or resulting from deficiency
34. Whichever of following dates shall be earliest* ia) date of purported completion as agreed
in contract, ib) date statute of limitations commences to run in relation to particular phase of work
provided in contract, \c) date statute commences to run in relation to contract where specified m
contract; id) date when payment in full received by person against whom action is brought for
particular phase in which deficiency occurred; (e) date person against whom action is brought
received final payment in full for contract, (0 date of substantial completion, (g) date of injury for
penonai injurv; or after period of limitations provided in contract, if contract so provides and if
period expires pnor to expiration of two yean from whichever of foregoing dates is earliest.
35. Set note 4 supra. Improvements do not include those made to residential property
36 Does not apply to express or implied contract, but includes actions for contribution or
indemnity
37 See note 2 supra.
38 Injury must occur within ten vean from date of substantial completion, which is defined
as date fint used or*irst available for use after completion in accordance with contract, whichever is
first.
39. See note 4 supra.
,40. Professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor
41. Design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property
42. Date of actual possession bv owner, date of abandonment of construction, or date of
completion or termination of contract
43 Except for actions involving latent defects, the four-vear statute of limitation applies. In
cases of latent defects, twelve-year statute of repose applies
44 Discovery is permitted to allow the plaintir? to uncover latent defects
45. Deficiency in survey, planning, design, specifications, supervision or observation of
construction, or construction of improvement to real property, injury to property, real or personal,
arising c .t of deficiency, injury to person or wrongful death arising out of deficiency
46. Substantial completion (defined as date when construction was sufficiently completed in
accordance with the contract, as modified by any change agreed to by the parties, so that the owner
could occupy the project for the intended use)
47 Eight vean generally, but in case of injury to person or property or injury causing
wrongful death, which injury occurred dunng seventh or eighth vear after substantial completion,
tort action mav be brought within two yean after date of injury, not to exceed ten vean from date
of substantial completion.
48. See note 4 supra.
49. Owner of real property or other person having an interest therein or in improvement, or
against person constructing, altering, or repairing improvement, or manufacturing or furnishing
materials incorporated in improvement, or performing or furnishing services m connection with
improvement
50. See note 2 supra.
51 VVuhm two vean of acquisition, not to exceed six vean after date of substantial
completion or abandonment of improvement unless injurv occurs in fifth or sixth year after date of
completion, if so, action must be brought within two vean of injury, but in no event more than
aght vean after date of completion.
52. U
53. Does not aoplv to actions tor damages against owner or other person having interest in
real property or improvement based on negligent conduct in repair or maintenance of
improvement, or to actions against surveyors for erron in boundary surveys.
54 Contract or tort.
55. See note 2 supra.
56, fa) Ton actions accrue and statute commences to run six yean after final completion of
construction, (b) contract actions accrue and statute commences to run at tune of final completion
of construction
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57. Applies only to ton actions that do noc accrue within six vears after final completion of
construction.
58. Sue rune 4 suprm.
59. Won or service on real property or any product incorporated therein to become pan of
real property that does noc cause injury or propeny damage within six years after performance,
manufacture, assembly engineering, or design.
60. If no injury or damage within ux-year period, there is presumptive proof of reasonable
care by person doing any of the said acts.
61. All written guarantees.
62. Contract, ton, nuisance, or otherwise.
63. Set note 2 sup**.
64. Set note 3 supra.
65. Contract or ton.
66. Set note 2 supra,
67. Substantial completion denned as date when owner first occupied or commenced use.
68. Five yean generally, but in case of injury to property or person or wrongful death from
injury, which injury occurred dunng fifth year after substantial completion, action may be brought
within one year from date injury occurred, not to exceed six years after substantial completion.
69. See note 4 supra.
70. Ex-contractu, ex-delicto, or otherwise.
71. Deficiency in design, planning, supervision, inspection or observation of construction, or
in construction of an improvement to immovable propeny; damage to propeny, movable or
immovable, zrvung out of deficiency; action against a person for action or omission o( employees.
72. Ten vean after (1) date of registry in mongage office of acceptance bv owner; or (2) if no
such acceptance filed within ux months of dace owner occupies or takes possession, then after
occupation bv owner
73. In cases of injury to property or person or wrongful death that occun dunng runth year of
ten-vear penod, action mav be brought one year after date of injury, noc to exceed eleven /ears
74. Set note 4 supra. \r»y cause of action existing prior to Julv 29, 1964 will not be preempted
until July 29, 1965 or bv the provision established in this statute, whichever is later.
75. Licensed or registered architects or engineers.
76. Professional negligence or malpractice.
77 Four vean after discovery of malpractice or negligence, not to exceed ten yeans alter
substantial completion of construction contract or substantial completion of services, if no
construction contract involved.
78. Set note 77 supra.
79. Not applicable if parties have entered into valid contract which provides for different
limitation penods.
30. Specifically includes actions for contribution or indemnity
81. Architects or professional engineers are given special treatment but all persons are covered
by general provision.
82. Set note 2 supra.
83. Entire improvement became available for mten6ed use,
84 Three yean from dace of injurv but noc more than twenty vears after availability, except
that actions against architects or professional engineen must be brought within ten years.
85. Set note 4 supra.
86. Ton.
87. Deficiency or neglect in design, planning, construction, or general administration of
improvement to real property
88. Three vean after cause of action accrues, noc to exceed six vears after performance or
furnishing of design, planning, construction, or general administration.
89. State-licensed architect, professional engineer, or land surveyor, including an individual,
corporation, pannership, or business entity on behalf of whom architect, engineer, or surveyor is
performing or directing performance of architectural, engineering, or surveying service.
90. Set note 2 supra.
91. Time of occupancy of completed improvement, use of acceptance of such improvement
(for surveyors, at time of delivery of repon).
92. See note 4 supra.
93. See note 2 supra.
94. Set note 46 supra.
95. See note 47 supra.
96. Cases involving fraud or breaches of statutory warranties
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97 Injurv to real or personal property, injury to person, or wrongful death, arising out of
oatent denaencv tn design, planning, supervision, or obaervauon of construction or construction of
approvement to real property.
96. Written acceptance of construction by owner.
99. No action for contribution or indemnity unless there was a prior written agreement
providing for such action. Limitation does not apply to persons in actual possession and control for
which it is proposed to bring an action as heretofore controlled by other statutes or the Laws of the
state regarding ton or negligence actions.
100. Tort, including contribution and indemnify.
tOI. .Architects, engineers, or builden of defective improvements to real properry where sole
connection with improvement ts performing or furnishing in whole or in pan the design, planning,
or construction of improvement.
102. Set note 2 supra
103. Date of completion of improvement.
104. Set note 4 supra Does not apply where defendant mortal* defect or deficiency that
directly caused the detective or unsafe condition.
105 Excluding actions upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon a written
instrument
106. Damages resulting from or arising out of design, planning, supervision, inspection,
construction, or observation of construction, or of Land-surveying performed in connection with
improvement to real property.
107. Completion of improvement (degree o( completion at which owner can utilize
improvement for intended purpose or when completion certificate is executed, whichever is earlier).
108. Ten vean generally, but action for injury that occurred during tenth year after
completion mav be commenced within one year after injury occurred.
109. Breach of warranty of improvements to real property, or deficiency in design, planning,
supervision, or observation of construction, or construction of improvement to real property.
110. Act or omission giving rtse to action.
111. Within four vean, unless breach of warranty or deficiency is not or could not be
reasonably discovered within five years. In that instance, two years from discovery, but for breach
of warranty, not more than ten vears after act or omission.
112. Ton, contract, or otherwise.
113. Set note 2 supra.
114. See note 3 supra.
115. Six vean in all cases, except for action for injury to properry or person, or wrongful death,
in which case action mav be brought witrun one year after date of injury, not to exceed seven years
after substantial completion of improvement.
116. Set note 4 supra.
117. Including contribution indemnity.
118. St* note 2 supra.
119. Performance or furnishing of services and construction.
120. Set note 4 supra.
121. Contract, ton, or otherwise, including contribution or indemnity.
122. See note 2 supra.
123. See note 3 supra.
124. See note 4 supra
125. See note \ 17 supra.
126. See note 2 supra.
127. Substantial completion (date construction surrkiently completed so that property can be
used for intended purpose, or date owner occupies or uses, or date established by contractor,
whichever occurs last).
128. Not applicable to action based on contract, warranty, or guarantee expressly inconsistent
with statute. See <U.J note 4 supra.
129. See note \\7 supra
130. See note 2 supra.
131. Performance or furnishing of services and construction.
132. Set note 4 supra.
133. Contract (oral or written, sealed or unsealed), ton or otherwise.
134. See note 2 supra.
135. See note 3 supra
136. Ten vean generally, but in case of injury to properry or person, or wrongful death from
injury, which injury occurred during tenth year after substantial completion, ton action may be
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brought within two years after date of injury, not to exceed twelve years after substantial
completion.
137. Set note 4 supra.
138. Set note 2 supra.
139. Performance or furnishing of services and construcuoo.
140. Set note 4 supra.
141. Ton.
142. Includes any penon owning, leasing, or in posse mon of improvement, or performing or
furnishing the design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction.
143. Set note 2 supra.
144. Set note 3 supra.
145. Injury to person or properrv arising from another person having performed construcuoa,
alteration or repair of improvement to real property, or supervision or inspection thereof, or from
furnishing design, planning, surveying, architectural, or engineering services.
146. Two >ears from date of injury, noc to exceed ten years from substantial compleuoo
(written acceptance of improvement, or, if none, date of acceptance of construction, alteration, or
repair).
147. See note 4 supra.
148. See note 2 supra.
149 Completion of construction.
150. Twelve years, except in cases of injury or wrongful death occurring between tea and
twelve years after completion, where action may be commenced within the time otherwise provided
but noc later than fourteen vears after completion.
151. Possible discovery bv reasonable extension of General State Auth. v. Lawne k Green, 24
Pa. Commw Ct. 407, 356 A2d 851 (1976).
152. See note 4 supra.
153. Ton, including arbitration proceedings, and contribution or indemnity
154. Architect, professional engineer, contractor, subcontractor, or materialman.
155. Set note 2 supra.
156. See note 3 supra.
157. Architects, professional engineers, or contractors.
158. Deficiency in design, planning, supervision, observation of construction, construction of or
surveying in connection with improvement to real property; injury to property, real or personal,
arising out of deficiency; injury to penoex or wrongful death arising out of deficiency
159. Substantial completion defined as "when useable for intended purpose,"* but may be
established bv written agreement between contractor and owner
160 Ten years after substanuai completion, except in cases of injury to properrv or penon, or
wrongful death, which injury occurred during ninth or tenth vear after substantial completion,
action may be brought within two years after date of injury, not 10 rscrrd twelve years after
substanuai completion.
161. Provisions of any guarantee, bonds, or other similar instruments or agreement of parties
for the bringing of any action. Not available to person guilty of fraud m performance or of
concealing a cause of action. Set aim note 4 supra.
162. See note 2 supra.
163 Substantial completion (date construction sufficiently completed for occupation or
intended use).
164. Six years, except in cases involving injury to properrv or person, which injury occurred
during sixth year after substanuai completion, or death, action may be brought within one year of
date of injury, not to exceed seven vears.
165. See note 4 supra.
166. Deficiency in design, planning, supervision, observation of construction, construction of or
surveying in connection with improvement to real property; injury to property, real or personal,
arising out of deficiency; injury to person or wrongful death arising out of deficiency.
167. See note 3 supra.
168. Four vears, except where mjurv to property or person, which injury causes wrongful
death, occurs during fourth vear after substantial completion, then action may be brought within
one year after date of injury, not to exceed five vears.
169 See note 117 supra.
170. Registered or licensed engineer or architect, and anyone performing or furnishing
construction or repair or improvement to real property
171. Injury, damages, or loss to real or personal property, injury to person or wrongful death
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truing out of defective or unsafe condition of real property, equipment, or improvement attached
thereto
172. Se* note 3 sup**.
173. Ten vears after substantia] completion; two vears from date of injury, loo, damage, or
death where such occurs dunng tenth year after substantia] completion.
174. There is a rwo»vear extension from time written claim is presented to potential defendant
if presented within ten years of substantial completion. Statucc will not apply to a suit on a written
warramy, guarantee, or other contract that expressly is effective for a greater period, or an action
based on willful misconduct or fraudulent concealment. Se* *is* note 4 supr*.
173. See note 2 supra.
176 Completion of construaion (date of issuance of certificate of substantia] completion, or
date of owner s use or possession).
177 St* note 4 Apr*
178. S*r note 117 suprm.
179 St* note 2 supra.
180 Performance or furnishing of services and construction.
181 Manufacturer or supplier of equipment or articles installed upon real property See ais*
note 4 supra.
182. All claims arising out of construction, alteration, or repair of improvement upon real
propenv, including*design, planning, surveying, architectural or construaion or engineering
KTvices, supervision or observation of construction, or administration of construaion contracts
183 Substantial completion, or termination of services, whichever is later (substantial
completion defined as time improvements mav be used for intended purpose)
184 Time allowed under applicable statute of limitation, or six years for substantial
completion or termination of services, whichever is Later.
185 See note 4 supra.
186. Injurv to property or person, bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of defective and
unsafe condition of improvement to real property, including design, surveying, planning,
supervision, supplying materials, or construaion
187 Substantial completion
188. Extension of six months where injury or defea occurs or is discovered between five and six
years after substantial completion
189 Ton, contract, or otherwise.
190 See note 2 supra.
191. Substantial completion (degree of completion at which utilization of improvement for
intended use is possible)
192. Ten vears generally, but if the injury to property or person causes death and occurs
dunng ninth year after substantial completion, action may be brought within one year after date of
injury
193. See note 4 supra.
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CHART III

Medical Malpractices Statutes of Repose
Legal
Theory
AL
CA
CO
CT
DC
FL
CA
H!
ID
IL
IA
KS
KY
LA
MD
MO
MT
NB
NV
NH
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OR
SC
SO
TN
UT
VT
WA

Code

Defendants

Subject
Matter

Commencemem

S*
S7
S»*

S-»
S«
S»3

X*

x*

X

X'4

X»*

»6

S>7

x»«

$21

s»
s»

X23

S»
N
S"
N

S

S-*
S26

S27

N

s

S3*
S^

N

SJ*

S4*
N

S4*

X"
• N

s*
s*

S

S

6l

S

N
S**
S*>
X**
N
N
N
V

*2

SJ2

S*
S4*
S4*

s*>
s"
S

i9

S

*3

S**

s«

S*9

s:o

s74

S"

N7«
S«»
S<*
S*»

S7*
S«
S«7

V96

S97

N
N
N
.V

49

•

S92

X»
X"

X7'
X7*
X

X*

X

3 24

Yes

IO

I9

X23

4/730

X34

x»
X

X47

42

X48

x»
X"
Y«
Yet

x«
2/107*

X73
X77

80

Ye.

x«

X* 4
X**

X93
X98

X"

X"

NI00

S101

X»02

5103

06

l.3
II7

X'
XH0
X114

N

s

SJI6

S

$120

SI21

Sl22

X123

X

X

S 123

N

N

X>?6

S'»
N

5IX)

X

Si33

XI34

i3*

Si37

X138

94

4/10'03
X«07

4U1

X

U 2

Xl,3

tl8

5128

S

Lxcrpitptm

X*

x4*
x»>
x*
x*0
x*4
x«7

S

N
N

Consntuuonaltcy

X"
X41

S 104
Sios

5t09

Length

X

II9

X124
Ye*

X»27
XI32

t3t

XI33

3

Yei

Xl39

S - Specified
N - Not Spoofed
G - Gcncrai

1. Contract or tort.
2. Physicians, surgeons, dentists, medical institutions, or other health care providers.
3. Liability, error, mistake, or failure to cure.
4. Act or omission giving rue to claim.
5. Constitutionality is suspect; pnor statute before amendment held unconstitutional.
6. Minor under four years old has until eighth birthdav Any error, mistake, act, omission,
or failure to cure that gave rise to a daun and accrued be/ore September 23, 1973 cannot be barred
be/ore September 23, 1976.
7. Health care provider defined as licensed or certified person, dime, health dispensary, or
health facility, including legal representatives of a health care provider.
8. Professional negligence defined as negligent act or omission to act that is the proximate
cause of a personal injury or wrongful death, provided that such acts are within the scope o£ services
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for which the provider u licensed and are not within any restncuon imposed by the licensing
agency or licensed hospital
9 Date of injury
10 Statute is toiled upon proof of fraud, intentional concealment, or presence of foreign
object in person Actions on behalf of minor under six yean shall be commenced within three veaxi
or prior to eighth birthday, whichever provides a longer period
11 Ton or contract
12 Licensed hospital, health care facility, dispensary, or other institution for treatment of sack
or injured or anv person licensed in mediane, chiropracucs, physical therapy, podiatry, veterinary
medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, optometry, nursing, or other healing arts.
13 As to institutions, negligence, or breach of contract in providing care, lack of providing
care, or lack of informed consent Individuals also are liable for actions based on failure to posses
or exercise that dc^nt of skill actually or impliedly represented, promised, or agreed that they
possess and would exercise
14 Act or omission that gives nat to claim
15 Statute does not apply if defendant knowingly conorali act or omission, or if the action is
based on the leaving of an unauthorized foreign object in the patient's body Minors under six
have until age eight to bnng suit Tune does not run against minors under eighteen who do not
have a natural or legal guardian, such persons have two yean from appointment of guardian or
eighteenth birthday to commence action
16 Phvsiaan. surgeon, dentist, podiatrist, chiropractor, hospital, or sanitarium
17 Negligence, reckless or wanton misconduct, or malpractice.
18 Date of the act or omission
19 A counterclaim may be interposed at any time before the pleadings in such action are
finallv closed
20 Ton or breach of contract
21 Health care provider
22 Health care malpractice resulting in personal injury or death
23 Date upon which injury occurred
24 Action for personal injury only must be brought within three yean of date injury
occurred, and onlv if during the first two vean the injury was unknown and could not have been
discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
25 Minors under six have three yean from injury or until sixth birthday, whichever is longer,
to bring suit
26 Contract or tort
27 Provider of health care, pnviry required
28 Death, injury, or monetary loss arising out of medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis,
treatment, or care,
29 Date of incident or occurrence out of which cause of actsoo accrued
30 If fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation prevent discovery within four-year
limit, period is extended two yean forward from discovery, but in no event is to exceed seven yean
from incident
31 Persons authorized bv law, or othen acting under the supervision and control o( such
lawfully authorized persons and hospitals, nursing homes, clinics, hospital authorities, facilities or
institutions.
32 Claims for damages resulting from death of, or injury to, any person, arising out of health,
medical, dental, or surgical service, diagnosis, prescription, treatment, or cure
33 Date upon which the negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred.
34 Does not apply if a foreign object has been left in a patient s body
35 Chiropractor, clinical laboratory technician, dentist, naturopath, nurse, nursing home
administrator, dispensing optician, optometrist, osteopath, phvsiaan, surgeon, physical therapist,
podiatrist psvchologxst, or vetennanan licensed by state, or licensed hospital as the employer of any
nich person
36 Professional negligence, rendering services without consent, error, or omission.
3? Date of the alleged act or omission causing injury or death.
38 Limitation is toiled for any period during whjch defendant has Called to discloar any act,
error or omission which u known to him.
39 Provision is contained in general statute for all professional malpractice, but hospitals,
physicians, or other persons or institutions practicing any of the healing arts are specified in an
exception for foreign objects.
40 Damages for professional malpractice, for an injury to the person, or for the death of one
caused by wrongful act or neglect of another
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41 Time of the occurrence, act, or omission complained of (limitation penod snail not be
extended bv reason o( anv continuing consequences or damages resulting therefrom, or by any
continuing professional or commercial relationship between the injured party and the alleged
wrongdoer)
42. Does not aoplv to actions based on foreign objects left in patient's body, or if wrongdoer
has fraudulently and knowingly concealed facts from the injured party.
43. Tort, breach of contract, or otherwise.
44 Anv phvsician or hospital duly licensed under laws of state.
45. Action for damages for injury or death arising out of patient care.
46. Date upon which the act. omission, or occurrence alleged in such action to have been
cause of injury or death occurred.
47 There is split of authority in intermediate appellate courts. Gmpmt Woodward v
Burnham City Hosp, 60 III App 3d 285, 377 N E.2d 290 (1978) (four-year repose violates state
constitution bv constituting special legislation) untA Anderson v Wagner, 79 UL App. 2d 295, 402
N.£.2d 560 M979) (four-vear repose does not violate state constitution).
48. Under eighteen, insane, mentaJlv ill, or imprisoned on criminal charges; penod of
limitations does not run until disability is removed.
49 Licensed phvsician and surgeon, osteopath, osteopathic physician and surgeon, dentist,
podiatrist, optometrist, pharmacist, chiropractor, nurse, or licensed hospital.
50 Personal injurv or wrongful death arising out of patient care
51 Date upon which the act, omission, or occurrence alleged to have been the cause of injury
or death occurred
52. Cases in which foreign object left in body caused injury or death are subject TO limitations.
53. Excepts actions arising from contract.
54 A health care provider is defined as one who is licensed to practice any branch of healing
arts, one who holds a temporary permit to practice any branch of healing arts, or one who is
engaged in postgraduate program approved by state board of healing arts, a licensed medical care
facility, a health maintenance organization, a licensed dentist, a licensed professional nurse, a
licensed practical nurse, a licensed optometrist, a registered podiatrist, a professional corporation
authorized to provide health care, a registered pharmacist, or a registered physical therapist
55 Rendering of, or failure to render, professional services.
56 Act giving rise to the cause of action
57 Person under eighteen years of age, incapacited, or imprisoned for a term less than life
must bnng action withm one year after disability is removed, but in any case no more than eight
years bevond time of act giving rise to cause of action
58 Phvsician, surgeon, dentist, or licensed hospital.
59 Negligence or malpractice
60. Date on which negligent act or omission is said to have occurred.
61 Tort, contract, or otherwise
62. Physician, chirooractor. dentist, or licensed hospital.
63. Arising out of patient care
64. Date of alleged act. omission, or neglect.
65 "Health care provider* includes hospitals, related institutions, physaaans, osteopaths,
optometrists, registered or licensed practical nurses, dentists, podiatrists, and physical therapists.
66. Action for damages for injury arising out of rendering of or failure to render professional
services bv health care proviaer
67 Date injury was committed
68. For minors under the age of sixteen, tune commences to run at sixteenth birthday
69 Physicians, hospitals, dentists, registered or licensed practical nurses, optometrists,
podiatrists, pharmacists, chiropractors, professional physical therapists, and any other entity
providing health care services, and employees of foregoing acting us course and scope o(
employment
70. Malpractice, negligence, error, or mistake related to health care, special provision for
introducing and negligently permitting any foreign object to remain within the body of a living
person.
71. Date of act of neglect giving rise to cause of action.
72. Section has two repose Limitations. With the exception of cases involving foreign objects,
action must be brought within two vean of act or omission, regardless of when injury occurs.
Actions for foreign objects must be filed within ten yean of act or omission.
73 Prior statute upheld in Laughlin v Forgrave, 432 S.W 2d 308 (Mo. 1968).
74. Phvsician. surgeon, dentist, registered nurse, nursing home administrator, dispensing
optician, optometrist, licensed pnvsical therapist, podiatrist, psychologist, osteopath, chiropractor.
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clinical laboratory bioanalvst, clinical laboratory technologist, pharmacist, veterinarian, licensed
ho»p»tal, or long term care facility as employer of any such person.
75 Injury or death arising out of alleged professional negligence, error, or omission, or for
rendering service without consent
76 Date of mjurv
77 Limitation a tolled for anv period dunng which health care provider failed to disclose act,
error, or omission upon which action is based and which is known, or which would have been
known through use of reasonable diligence.
78 General statute covering all professionals.
79 Rendering or failure to render professional services, or breach of warranty
80 Date of rendering or failure to render professional service that is basis for cause of action.
81 "Provider of health care'* includes licensed phvsiaan, dentist, jegnicicd nurse, dispensing
optician, optometrist, registered physical therapist, podiatrist, licensed psychologist, chiropractor,
doctor of traditional Oriental medicine, medical laboratory director or technician, or licensed
hospital as employer of any such person
82 Professional negligence, professional services rendered without consent, error, or oouaooo
resulting in personal mjurv or death
83 Date of injury
84 Limitation tolled for period during which health care provider has concealed any act,
error, or omission upon which action is based and which u or should have been known to him.
Minors are excepted from the statute only in case of brain damage or birth defect (until age ten) or
sterility (two yean from discovery of condition)
85 T o n , contract, or otherwise
86 Phvsiaan, physician's assistant, registered or licensed practical nurse, hospital, dime, or
not-for-profit home health care agency licensed by the state or otherwise lawfully providing medical
care or services.
87 Actions for adverse, untoward, or undesired consequences arising out of or sustained in
the course of professional services rendered failure to diagnose, premature abandonment of a
patient or of a course of treatment, or failure to maintain properly equipment or appliance
necessary to render professional services
88 Act. omission, or failure complained of
89 Actions based on discovery of a foreign object in the body of the injured person Minors
under eight vears have until their tenth binhdav
90 Tort or contract
91 Doctor of medicine, hospital, outpatient health care facility, doctor of osteopathy,
chiropractor, podiatrist nurse anesthetist, or phvsiaan s assistant
92 Medical treatment, lack of medical treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted
standards of health care that proximately results in injury to patient.
93 Date of act of malpractice
94 Minors under six vears have until their ninth birthday
95 Statute is broadly worded
96 Bv case law does not include dentist
97 Act, omission, or failure
98 Time of the act, omission, or failure complained of, or date of the last treatment in cases of
continuous treatment for the same illness
99 Actions based on the discovery of a foreign object in patient's body
100 Ccncrzi statute covering ail profasionMli.
101 Causes of action for maipractice arising out of the performance of or failure to perform
professional services.
102 Last act of defendant giving nse to cause of action
103 Ten-vear limitation applies to actions involving foreign objects left in body; four-year
limitation applies to all other actions.
104 Phvsiaan or licensed hospital
105 Act or omission
106 Date of act or omission of alleged malpractice.
107 Exception if discovery was prevented bv fraudulent conduct of phvsiaan or hospital.
State statute on disabilities, extending limitations on filing actions, apply
108 "Hospital" includes any person, corporation, association, board, or authority responsible
for operation of any hospital licensed or registered in state. "Phvsiaanw includes all persons
licensed to practice medicine and surgery or osteopathic medicine and surgery by state medical
board
109 Diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person
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110. Date of act constituting malpractice.
111. Civil action for nonconsensual abortion must be commenced within one yea* after the
abortion*
112. A minor under ten yean of age has until fourteenth birthday to commence ar^^^
Written notice, prior to expiration of specified time penod. given to any person involved ia *
medical malpractice case bv plaintiff, indicating that plaintiff is considering bringing an action
extends time period one hundred and eighty days after notice is given.
113. Medical, surgical, or dental treatment, omission, or operation resulting in personal injury
114. Date of treatment, omission, or operation upon which action is based.
US. If no action is commenced within five years due to fraud, deceit, or misleadiat
representation, action may be brought within two years from date that fraud, deceit, or
representation is discovered or should have been discovered.
116. Licensed health care provider.
117. Treatment, omission, or operation giving rue to personal injury.
118. Date of occurrence.
119. Applies only to causes of action that arose after June 10, 1977. If there is fraudulent
concealment by defendant, or a foreign object has negligently been left in a patient's body, plaintiff
has one year from date of discovery.
120. Contract or tort.
121. Physician, surgeon, dentist, hospital, sanitarium, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse,
chiropractor, or other practitioner of the healing arts.
122. Malpractice, trror% mistake, or failure to cure.
123. Time of alleged malpractice, error, mistake, or failure to cure.
124. Exception for filing counterclaim if cause was not barred at the time the suit was
originated.
125. Contract or tort.
126. Date upon which negligent act or omission occurred.
127. If there is fraudulent concealment by defendant, or a foreign object has negligently been
left in a patient's body, plaintiff has one year from discovery.
128. Action in contract, ton, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon
alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out oi health care.
129. "Health care provider" includes anv person, partnership, association, corporation, or
other facility or institution that causes to be rendered or that renders health care of professional
services as a hospital, phvsician. registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse-midwife, dentist,
dental hvgientst, optometrist, clinical laboratory technologist, pharmacist, physical therapist,
podiatrist, psychologist, chiropractic physician, naturopathic physician, osteopathic physician and
surgeon, audiologist, speech pathologist, certified social worker, social service worker, social service
aide, marriage and family counselor, or practitioner of obstetrics, and others rendering similar care
and services, including officers, employees, or agents of any of the above acting in course and scotx
of employment.
130. Act, omission, neglect, or occurrence giving rise to personal injuries.
131. Date of alleged act, omission, neglect, or occurrence.
132. .Actions in which plaintiff alleges that defendant wrongfully left a foreign object in the
patients body, or the defendant affirmatively acted fraudulently to conceal the alleged omission.
133. Medical or surgical treatment or operation giving roe to personal injury.
134. Date o( the incident.
133. No repose limitation if fraudulent concealment has prevented the patient's discovery o(
the negligence, or if a foreign object in the patient's body is noc discovered. There is a speanc
section for injury due to ionizing radiation (twenty-year repose penod). Toiling oi statute for
persons under a legal disability is noc affected.
136. Includes, but is not limited to, a physician, osteopathic physician, dentist, nurse
optometrist, podiatrist, chiropractor, physical therapist, psychologist, pharmacist, optician,
physician's assistant, osteopathic physician's assistant, nurse practitioner, physician's trained mobile
intensive care paramedic, or an empiovee or agent of above, acting in course. and scope of
employment; or an entity, facility, or institution, including, but not limited to, a hospital, clinic,
health maintenance organization, or nursing home, or an officer, director, employee or agent
thereof, acting in course and scope of employment.
137. Professional negligence, act, or omission.
138. Date of act or omission.
139. Does not apply to persons under legal disability, or to services provided before June 2*
1976.
140. General statute of limitation.
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CHART IV

Product Liability Statutes of Repose*
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Specified

N - Not Specified
D - Defined
G «• General
This chart only includes states which have enacted statutes of repose specifically for product liability actions.
Some nates have reneral statutes of repose thai wouid apply to such actions, or have provuions that may have
umtiar impact. For aMtnpke* Michigan law denses tike puuncuf the benefit of any presumption in proving a
prima (aoe case in acuona in watch a product has been in use Aw ieas than ten years.

1. Bases of action limited to negligence, innocent or negligent misrepresentation, the manufacturer's liability doctrine, tbc Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine, breach of
implied warranty, or breach of oral express warranty Eliminated by omission are intentional misrepresentation and breach of express written warranty
2. Original seller, meaning any person, firm, corporation, association, partnership, or other
legal or business entity selling or distributing manufactured product; excludes those who acquired
manufactured product for resale or distribution in unused condition or as component of unused
product to be sold in unused condition.
3. Actions limited to those ansing from manufactured products.
4. Action must be brought within ten yean after federal or state governmental agency has
imposed requirement to alter, repir, recall, inspect, or issue wmnungt about product, and injury or
disease has resulted from original seller's failure to comply.
5. July 30, 1979 (no retroactive application).
6. Bv written agreement, original seller expressly may waive or extend limitation in statute.
7. All legal theories, except limitation, do not apply to actions based on negligence or breach
of express warranty by manufacturer or teller.
8. Manufacturer defined as a person or enory who designs, assembles, fabricates, produces,
constructs, or prepares product or component prior to sale; seller includes wholesaler, distributor,
retailer, or lessor.
9. An individual product or component part of a product.
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10. September 3, 2978 (applicable oniy to causes of action accruing alter this date).
11. Action may be brought regardless of legal theory, except that no action based on stria
liability in tort may be brought against seller unless seller is also manufacturer of product.
12. Manufacturer or seller, if seller had actual knowledge of the defect, furnished specifica*
tions relevant to the alleged defect, exercised some significant control over the manufacturing pro*
^ ^ ygnihcantlv altered product before sale, or is owned bv manufacturer.
13. Ten yean after the date the product was sold for use or consumption, it shall be rebutu bly presumed that product was not defective, manufacturer or seller was not negligent, and all
warnings and instructions were proper and adequate.
14. July 1, 1977.
15. Includes, but is not limited to, strict liability in tort, negligence, expressed or implied
breach of warranty, breach of or failure to discharge a duty to warn or instruct, whether negligent
or innocent misrepresentation or nondisclosure.
16. Product sellers, including manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, or retailers engaged in
the business of selling products, whether the saie is (or resale, use, or consumption; lessors or bailors
of products.
17. Product or component pan of product, whether for sale, use, or resale; privity not
required.
18. Action must be brought within ten yean from date defendant last parted with pnatriiion
or control of product.
19 All actions brought on or before October 1, 1979.
20. Ten-year limit snail not apply to claimant who is not entitled to compensation under
Chapter 568, provided such claimant can prove that harm occurred during useful safe life of
product.
21 % Statute of repose declared unconstitutional. Battilia v. Allis Chalmen Mfg. Co., 392 So.
2d 874 (Fla. 1980). Limitation mav be extended by terms of any express written warranty that the
product can be used for more than ten yean.
22. Manufacturer or seller of a product.
23. Twelve yean from date of delivery of completed product to original purchaser, or twelve
years from date of commission of alleged fraud, regardless of date of discovery of defect or fraud.
24 Applicable only to causes of actions accruing on or after October 1, 1978.
25. Ton or contract. Abrogates pnviry requirements for ton actions; confines actions for
breach of duty under contract to actions in contract.
26. Manufacturers of personal property sold as new property.
27. Personal property sold as new property.
28. Effective July 1, 1978.
29. Speahcallv prohibits manufacturers from excluding or limiting operation of statute.
30. Product sellers (person or entity), including lesson, bailors, and manufacturen.
31. Objects possessing intnnsic value, capable of delivery, and produced for introduction into
trade or commerce.
32. From delivery (but not more than the useful safe life of the product).
33 In claims that involve harm caused more than ten yean after delivery, a presumption
anses that the harm was caused after the useful safe life had expired. This presumption may be
rebutted only bv clear and convincing evidence.
34. July 1, 1980.
35. Statutes of repose inapplicable: for express warranties providing for greater period; for
intentional misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment of information; for claims for contribution
or indemnity; if the harm was caused by prolonged exposure to a defective product; if the injurycausing aspect of the product that existed at the time of delivery was not discoverable by an ordinary, reasonably prudent person until more than ten yean after the tune of delivery; or, if the
harm, caused within ten yean after the time of delivery, did not manifest itself until after that time.
36. Strict liability in ton.
37. Seller, denned as one who sells, distributes, leases, assembles, installs, produces, manufactures, fabricates, prepares, constructs, packages, labels, markets, repairs, maintains, or otherwise is
involved in placing product in the stream of commerce.
38. Product: anv tangible object or goods distributed in commerce.
39 Period is twelve yean from date of first sale, lease, or delivery of pmwiion bv a seller, or
ten vean from date offirstsale, lease, or delivery of possession to initial user, consumer, or nonsefler,
whichever period expires earlier. If there is anv alteration, modification, or furnishing of materials
*" tuch change, and there is proof that changed defective materials, workmanship, or specifications
caused use injury, action must be brought within ten yean of such alteration. Notwithstanding
the* limitations, if the injury complained of occun within any of those periods, suit may be
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brought within two years after discovery of or, when through the use of reasonable dilig
plaintiff should have discovered the injuries, but in no event more than eight years after th
which such injury occurred.
40. June 1, 1979
41. Period of limitation does not apply if defendant has expressly warranted or pror
product, or authorised alteration, for a longer penocL If person entitled to bnng action *
time of injury under eighteen vears, insane, mentally ill, or imprisoned on criminal charge
of limitation does not run until disability is removed. Dliooa has provisions requiring a c
other than a manufacturer to idenurv the manufacturer: statute may be tolled to perm
implementation of these provisions. See *u» note 38 svpr*.
42. All theories, including negligence and strict liability in tort, but excluding actic
on alleged breach of warranty.
9
43. Sellers, defined as manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, or distributors.
44. Action must be commenced within ten years from delivery to initial user or const
if injury occurs more than eight years but less than ten years after delivery, action mav
menced at any time within two years alter cause of action accrues.
45. June 1, 1978 (does not apply to a cause of action that accrues before that date
46. Does not arTect the right of any person found liable to seek and obtain indemr
any other person whose actual fault caused a product to be defective.
47. Manufacturers and product sellers. The Latter are liable if their actions are tnvo
the claimant is unable to obtain satisfaction from the manufacturer.
48. There is a rebuttable presumption that useful safe life expires after ten ye
delivery.
49 There u no liability if the product seller "proves by a preponderance of the evtd
the harm was caused after the product's 'useful safe life' had expired."
50. Upon publication in the 1981 code.
51 Manufacturers, excludes wholesalers, distributors, and retailers selling product ir
condition or package unless they knew of defective condition or breached expressed war
52. Product presumed not defective if injury occurs either more than five vears aft
first customer or more than eight vears alter date of manufacture. Presumption is rebu
preponderance of evidence.
53. June 17, 1978.
54. Manufacturers, sellers, or lessors of product; no action based on strict liability in
be brought against seller or lessor unless he is also the manufacturer of product
55. July 22, 1978. Any cause of action or claim that any person may have on that
be brought not later than two vears following such date.
56. Transactions governed bv U C.C § 2-725, and cases involving asbestos injuries
57. Any legal theory whatsoever, except for actions based on fraudulent misrepre
concealment, or nondisclosure; actions based on written contract providing a different
limitation; and actions based on express or implied warranty that do not seek damages b
injury to person or property
58. Alter manufacturer of the ultimate product parted with possession and contro
whichever occurred Last.
59. If defendant is lessor, bailor, or licensor who has legal duty to inspect, maintain
or improve, men twelve years from the time that duty ccasn; or if durv is imposed by gove
agency to alter, recall, inspect, or issue warnings or instructions after plaintiff is in pos.
product, then ux vears after defendant incurred such legal duty This latter provision
shorten the existing tweive-vear period.
60. August 22, 1978 (applies to all product liability actions accruing after this date
causes accruing prior to this date on which no action has been instituted as of its efTec
except that the time shall be computed from effective date).
61. See note 58 mora.
62. Specifically includes actions based on implied warranty; absence of privity is n
63. Manufacturers and sellers, including lessors and bailors. So action, except bre.
press warranty, shall be maintained against seller if product was acquired and sold
container or seller had no opportunity to inspect. Provision does not apply if manuf
insolvent.
64. October 1. 1979; does not arTect pending litigation.
65. Act specifies actions based on breach of implied warranties, defects in design, tr
testing, or manufacture, failure to warn, or failure to instruct properly
66. Manufacturers or sellers, if seller had actual knowledge of defect; furnished ipe
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with defect; exercised significant control over manufacturer, modified product; or it owned by
manufacturer.
67. July 1, 1979.
68. Limitation applies regardless of legal disability* but shall not apply to any cause of action
msing within two years of effective date of act. If manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer issues recall,
modifies product, or becomes aware of defect and fajh to warn user, limitation shall not bar action
arising from defect.
69. Actions arising out of any design, inspection, testing, manufacturing, or other defect in a
product; any failure to warn regarding a product; or any failure to instruct properly in the use of a
product.
70. Manufacturer, distributor, seller, or lessor.
71. January 1, 1978.
72. Implied warrranty, failure to warn or instruct.
73. Manufacturers or sellers.
74. Act applies to all causes of action accruing after effective date (July 1, 1978).
75. Manufacturers, lessors, or sellers.
76. Date of delivery of completed product to first purchaser or lessee not engaged in business
of selling such product.
77. July 1, 1978 (does not apply to causes of action thai have arisen prior to that date).
78. Manufacturer or seller, including lessor or bailor; no action may be maintained against
seller if product was acquired or sold in sealed container, or if seller has no opportuniry to inspect.
Seller exdudec* from actions based on strict liability in tort unless seller is manufacturer or unless
manufacturer is insolvent or cannot be served process.
79. Tangible object or goods produced.
80. Under limitation provisions, action must be brought within six years of injury but not
more than ten vears after date first purchased for consumption «r one year after expiration of
product's anticipated life (which u placed on product by manufacturer, but does not run until
purchase), whichever is shorter.
81. Juiv 1, 1978.
82. Minors must bring action one year after reaching majority. Limitations do not apply to
action resulting from exposure to asbestos.
83. Actions based on breach of implied warranty, defects in design, inspection, testing, or
manufacture; failure to warn or instruct properly or any other alleged defect or failure of whatever
kind or nature in relation to a product.
84. Manufacturers or sellers. Immunity is given if alterations made subsequent to sale were a
substantial cause of injury.
85. Mav 10, 1977 (provisions of section on limitations shall not apply to anv cause of action if
the personal injury, death, or damage to property occurs within two years of effective date of act).
86. Manufacturers and product sellers. The latter are liable if their actions are involved or if
the claimant is unable to obtain satisfaction from the manufacturer.
87. "(Ojbject possessing intrinsic value, capable of delivery either as an assembled whole or as
i component part or parts and produced for introduction into trade or commerce."
88. There is no liability if the product seller "proves by a preponderance of the evidence that
the harm was caused after the product's 'useful safe life' had expired." There is a rebuttable presumption that useful safe life expires after twelve years from delivery of product to fint purchaser or
lessee.
89. July 26, 1981 (applies to all actions in which trial has not occurred prior to this date).
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MOST RECENT APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS
INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
STATE BUILDER AND ARCHITECT STATUTES
OF REPOSE AS OF MAY, 1987
Equal Protection

State
Alabama
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Montana
Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Washington
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Due Process

"Open Court
& Remedy"

Other

u
C

c
c
c

c
c

u*
c

c

c
c
c
c
c
c
c
u«

c

c
c
c
c
c
c

c
c
c

c
u*
c
c
c
c

c
c
c
c

U*

c
c
c
c
c
c

c
c
c
c
c

u*
c
c

c

u*
c
c
u*

Key:
C = Ground addressed by court and found constitutional
U = Ground addressed by court and found unconstitutional
" - Statute subsequently amended with no new decision
interpreting amended version
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APPENDIX V
RESPONDENT'S SUMMARY OF DECISIONS HOLDING
ARCHITECT AND BUILDERS STATUTES
UNCONSTITUTIONAL

INTRODUCTION
In the following cases, various state courts have held their
form of the architect-type statute of repose unconstitutional.
1.

ALABAMA

Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 435 So.2d 725 (Ala.
1983) . The Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the seven-year
construction statute of repose was unconstitutional based upon
the Alabama open court provision. The previous year the Court
had struck down Alabama's product liability statute of repose as
also in violation of the open court provision. Lankford v.
Sullivan, Long & Haqerty, 416 So.2d 996 (Ala. 1982). The Court
concluded that the defendants had failed to show a substantial
relationship between the statute of repose and the eradication of
any social evil required to make it constitutional. The Alabama
legislature has not amended the statute subsequent to the
decision.
2.

HAWAII

The Hawaii Supreme Court in Fujioka v. Kam, 514 P.2d 568
(Hawaii 1973) struck down the statute of repose on construction
of real property. It did so on the basis that the statute denied
equal protection since it unfairly discriminated against certain
classes of individuals. Even though the statute was held
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds the court upheld it
as to due process stating that there was a legitimate legislative
purpose in enacting this type of statute. See Note, "Actions
Arising Out of Improvements to Real Property: Special Statutes of
Limitations", 57 N.D. L.Rev. 43, 75 (1981).
Subsequently, the Hawaiian Legislature amended the statute
and essentially included every type of company or individual
which could be involved with the construction industry including
owners, architects, contractors, suppliers, and materialmen. The
court in 1982 again struck down this amended statute.
Shibuya v. Architects Hawaii Ltd., 647 P.2d 276 (Hawaii
1982). The court held that by including all members of the
construction industry in this statute it denied equal protection
to other members of the community who were in equal positions but
who were not afforded such immunity. The court was particularly
troubled by immunity given to a supplier of construction
materials as opposed to no immunity given to a supplier of other
types of materials.
The court in reviewing the legislative purpose of the
statute found that it had been enacted because construction
records become lost and destroyed, the longer the statutory
period the harder it becomes to distinguish between negligence in
design or construction and negligence in maintenance, and that in
Hawaii almost 80% of all claims are initiated in the first three
years. The court refused to strike down the statute on the basis

that it did not further a legitimate state objective and based
its opinion entirely upon equal protection of classes. The
Hawaii Legislature again amended the statute in 1983 and there
have been no decisions interpreting the amended statute as of
this time.
3.

KENTUCKY

In Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1985) the Supreme
Court of Kentucky held a five-year statute of repose
unconstitutional based upon a provision in the Kentucky
Constitution prohibiting local and special legislation. The
court noted that there was no legislative history showing
"committee meetings or legislative debate discussing its
purpose." Id. at 184. Several of the justices of that court
dissented on the basis that there was justification for
establishment of building designers as a separate class of
individuals. The Kentucky Legislature amended the statute in
1986 but there have been no decisions interpreting it as of this
time.
4.

NEVADA

The Nevada Supreme Court in State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. v. All Electric, Inc., 660 P.2d 995 (Nev. 1983) held the
Nevada six-year statute of repose unconstitutional as a denial of
equal protection. The court concluded there was no rational
basis for giving special treatment to architects and contractors
while not giving equal treatment to building owners and material
suppliers. The dissenting opinion noted that the parties
apparently agreed that the statute has a legitimate purpose:
providing repose for otherwise indefinite potential liability and
that the only challenge was that it unfairly discriminated
against certain classes. Id. at 1002. (J. Springer,
dissenting). The Nevada Legislature subsequently amended its
statute in 1983 and there have been no reported decision
interpreting the amended statute.
5.

OKLAHOMA

In Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla.
1977) the Oklahoma Supreme Court held its ten-year statute of
repose unconstitutional as violating the federal and state equal
protection clauses. While finding the statute unconstititutional
on equal protection grounds the court concluded it did not deny
due process of law and that no pre-existing right had been
terminated. See Note, "Actions Arising out of Improvements to
Real Property: Special Statutes of Limitations", 57 NoD. L.Rev.
43, 75 (1981). The Oklahoma statute was amended in 1979 but
there have been no subsequent decisions interpreting it.
6.

SOUTH CAROLINA

In Broome v. Truluck, 241 S.E.2d 739 (S.C.

1978) the

Supreme Court of South Carolina held that a statute providing
that any action brought against an architect, engineer or
contractor must be brought within ten years after substantial
completion violated the state's equal protection laws absent a
showing of any rational basis for discriminating against the
owners and manufacturers of components that go into the
construction of a building. The statute was amended in 1986 by
the South Carolina Legislature and there have been no subsequent
decisions interpreting it.
7.

SOUTH DAKOTA

The South Dakota Supreme Court in Daquaard v. Baltic
Co-Op Building Supply Assn., 349 N.W.2d 419 (S.D. 1984) held its
six-year statute of repose unconstitutional as a violation of the
state open court provision. The Court stated, "Appellants assert
[that the South Dakota statute] unconstitutionally locked the
courtroom door before Appellants had an opportunity to open it.
We agree." Id. at 424. A dissenting opinion contended that
the open court clause only guaranteed a right of access to the
courts for redress as to causes of action recognized under common
law or by statute and did not in and of itself create causes of
action. Id. at 427 (J. Wollman dissenting). In 1985 the
former statute was repealed and a new statute was enacted which
contained ten separate sections. There have been no reported
court decision interpreting this new statutory enactment.
8.

WYOMING

In Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo.
1980) the Wyoming Supreme Court held its ten-year statute of
repose unconstitutional in violation of its open court provision,
its provision requiring that all laws of a general nature shall
have uniform operation, and a provision that special laws shall
not be passed where general laws can be made applicable. The
court in its opinion reviewed the various cases that as of 1980
had been decided. Several of the states which the court cited as
having struck down statutes of repose subsequently approved such
statutes. See e.g., Illinois, Matayka v. Melia, 456
N.Eo2d 353 (111. App. 1983); Wisconsin, U.S. Fire Ins. Co, v.
E.D. Wesley Co., 301 N.W.2d 271 (Wis. App. 1980); Minnesota,
Calder v. City of Crystal, 318 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1982); and
Michigan, O'Brien v. Hazelet and Srdal, 299 N.W.2d 336
(Mich. 1980) . The Wyoming Legislature amended its statute in
1981. There have been no subsequent decisions interpreting it.
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APPENDIX VI
SUMMARY OF DECISIONS BY STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS UPHOLDING ARCHITECT AND BUILDERS
STATUTES OF REPOSE

The following cases represent decisions from state and
federal courts upholding the constitutionality of architect and
builder statutes of repose. These decisions relate to attacks of
equal protection, procedural due process, access to the courts,
and special legislation.
1.

ARKANSAS

In Carter v. Hartenstein, 455 S.W.2d 918 (Ark. 1970) the
court sustained a statute of respose which eliminated builder and
architect liability after four years from substantial completion
of construction. The court found that the equal protection
clause of the state constitution as well as the federal
constitution had not been violated by limiting the classes of
individuals subject to the protection of the statute. The court
also observed that the legislation did not amount to a special
privilege or immunity prohibited by the state constitution.
The Carter decision was appealed to the United States
Supreme Court which dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question. 401 U.S. 901 (1971). Numerous courts have equated the
dismissal for lack of a federal question with a decision on the
merits. See, Hartford Fire Ins. v. Lawrence, 740 F.2d
1362, 1366 (6th Cir. 1984); Annotation, 45 L.Ed.2d 791.
2.

CALIFORNIA

The California Supreme Court approved a ten-year statute of
limitation on construction in Regents of the University of
California v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 147 Cal.
Rptr. 486, 581 P.2d 197 (Cal. 1978).
In 1981 the California Court of Appeals in Salinero v.
Pon, 177 Cal. Rptr. 204 (Cal. App. 1981) held that the statute
did not violate either due process or equal protection of the
state and federal constitutions. Id. at 209-210.
Later, in 1982 the Court of Appeals in Barnhous v. City
of Pinole, 183 Cal. Rptr. 881 (Cal. App. 1982) expanded upon the
previous decision. The court held there was a rational basis as
far as the equal protection argument to distinguish contractors
and architects from owners, materialmen and suppliers. Id. at
888.
The court cited the prior language of the California Supreme
Court in the Regents case in upholding the claim that the
statute violated procedural due process. The court observed that
this type of statute which runs from the date of an event rather
than the date of discovery is a valid legislative prerogative.
The court concluded by stating, "To accept Appellant's
argument—that they must be permitted reasonable time from the
discovery of the damage to bring their lawsuit—would render the

discussion in Regents meaningless."
3.

Id. at 889.

COLORADO

The Supreme Court of Colorado (en banc) in Yarbro v. Hilton
Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1983) upheld the
constitutionality of the ten-year Colorado statute of repose.
The court held that the statute did not deny due process since it
was rationally related to a legitimate state objective. This
objective was to eliminate the enormous liability for
professional architects and engineers resulting from the
long-standing buildings that are completed. In addition, the
court addressed the problems involved with proof and the standard
of care that would have to be shown from a building built many
decades before. Id. at 826. The court also upheld the claim
that the statute denied equal protection finding that the classes
of individuals designated in the statute was reasonable.
Finally, in addressing the open court provision of the Colorado
Constitution the court held that the cause of action against the
architect never arose or vested and therefore there was no denial
of access to the court since a remedy was not available.
In 1984 the court again addressed the same statute. In
Criswell v. M.J. Brock & Sons, Inc., 681 P.2d 495 (Colo.
1984) the court upheld an amendment to the statute which added
additional classes of protected groups. Again, the court held
that equal protection had not been violated.
4.

DELAWARE

The Supreme Court of Delaware in Cheswold Volunteer Fire
Co. v. Lambertson Construction Co., 489 A.2d 413 (Del. 1985)
upheld the six-year statute of repose. The court concluded that
the statute bore a reasonable legislative objective in preventing
actions to be maintained against architects or their heirs many
years after the buildings had been completed and after evidence
and other vital witnesses were no longer available.
The court also upheld the statute based upon the "remedy for
injury clause" by holding that the legislature was empowered to
abolish common law causes of action in order to attain a
permissible legislative objective. Finally, the court sustained
the statute based upon equal protection by finding that
architects and engineers worked under special circumstances as
compared with suppliers, manufacturers, and owners. The court
then reviewed the cases from seven other jurisdictions in which
statutes had been held unconstitutional and stated that these
cases represented a minority view and the Delaware Supreme Court
chose to follow the majority rule in finding these type of
statutes constitutional. Id. at 419.
In 1986 the Supreme Court of Delaware again addressed the
constitutionality of this statute in City of Dover v.
International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., 514 A.2d 1086 (Del.
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1986) . The court concluded that this statute did not violate a
provision in the Delaware Constitution prohibiting special laws
to be enacted nor did it violate a provision requiring the title
of enacting legislation to clearly identify its subject matter.
5.

FLORIDA

In 1979 the Supreme Court of Florida held its twelve-year
statute of repose on construction to be unconstitutional on the
basis that it denied access to the courts. Overland
Construction Co., Inc., 369 S.2d 572 (Fla. 1979). The court
concluded that the legislature had failed to show an overpowering
public necessity for the prohibititory provision.
In the following year the Florida Supreme Court in Batilla
v. Alice-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So.2d 374 (Fla. 1980) held that
the Florida product liability statute was also unconstitutional
in that it violated the state open court provision. The court in
Batilla relied upon the Overland decision in its analysis.
In 1985 the Florida Supreme Court reversed itself as to the
product liability statute of repose and in Pullum v.
Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1985) stated that the
product liability statute of repose was constitutional in terms
of the open court provision of the Florida Constitution. The
Court noted, "The legislature, in enacting this statute of
repose, reasonably decided that perpetual liability places an
undue burden on manufacturers, and it decided that twelve years
from the date of sale is a reasonable time for exposure to
liability for manufacturing of a product." Id. at 659.
See also, Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft,
631 F. Supp. 1144 (D. Fla. 1986).
After the Overland Construction Co. case the Florida
legislature amended its building statute of repose including an
extensive preamble showing legislative intent. The Florida Court
of Appeals in American Liberty Ins. Co. v. West and Convers,
491 So.2d 573 (Fla. App. 1986) held that the new amended
statute was constitutional as to the open court provision. The
court relied upon the new language contained in the statute
showing legislative intent and also upon the Florida Supreme
Court's decision in Pullum which overruled Batilla and impliedly
overruled Overland Construction Co.
6. GEORGIA
In Nelms v. Georgian Manner Condominium Assn., 321 S.E.2d
330 (Ga. 1984) the Supreme Court held that an eight-year statute
of repose on construction did not unconstitutionally deny access
to the courts. The court distinguished the Constitution of
Georgia from that of Kentucky, Florida and Alabama. The court
concluded that the "right of access" in Georgia was- limited to
insuring the right of self-representation to every person. The
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court noted, however, that there were other decisions by other
state supreme courts in which the "right of access" was held not
to prevent the legislature from altering common law or statutory
causes of action.
7.

IDAHO

The Idaho Supreme Court upheld its six-year architect
statute of repose on the basis that it did not violate the state
constitution's "remedy" provision, federal and state requirements
of equal protection, nor a state constitution provision
forbidding special laws. The Court stated that there was a split
of authority in the country but that it chose to follow the
majority view.
8. ILLINOIS
The Illinois Supreme Court in Skinner v. Anderson, 231
N.E.2d 588 (111. 1967) held that the statute of repose was
invalid because it granted exclusive immunity to architects and
contractors and was not reasonably related to any legislative
purpose. Subsequently, in 1982 the Illinois Legislature amended
the prior statute. The Illinois Supreme Court held a statute of
repose relating to medical malpractice constitutional on the
basis that the classification for a reasonable relation to the
purposes of the act and the evil it sought to remedy.
Anderson v. Wagner, 402 N.E.2d 560 (111. 1980).
The Court of Appeals of Illinois in Matayka v. Mellia,
456 NeE.2d 353 (111. App. 1983) upheld the constitutionality of
the revised statute on the basis that there was a permissible
legislative purpose in enacting the statute thereby negating a
claim of special legislation and satisfying state and federal
due process.
9.

INDIANA

The Federal District Court of Indiana in Daque v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 513 F. Supp. 19 (D. Ind. 1980) upheld a
constitutional attack against the Indiana product liability
statute of repose. The court observed that the Indiana
Legislature clearly had the power to modify or abolish common law
rights and remedies provided that no vested right was disturbed.
The Indiana Supreme Court in Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
418 N.E.2d 207 (1981) held that the product liability statute of
repose did not violate the open court provision of the Indiana
Constitution.
In 1983 the Court of Appeals in Beecher v. White, 447
N.E.2d 622 (Ind. App. 1983) upheld the ten-year construction
statute of limitations. The Indiana Appellate Court cited
numerous decisions by various courts throughout the country both
sustaining and overruling architect-type statutes. The court
denied the equal protection attack upon the statute on the basis
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that an owner was in a different classification than a builder or
architect since the owner has continuing control over the
building and is able to prevent deterioration. The court
observed that in view of the fact that so many of the courts in
other jurisdictions have upheld the constitutionality of the acts
as a permissible classification "it would be intellectual
arrogance on our part to classify the act of our own legislature
as manifestly unreasonable or arbitrary." Id. at 627. The
court observed that the clear trend of the decisions throughout
the country uphold the statutes and that the Supreme Court of
Indiana had indicated its approval of these principles in the
product liability and malpractice areas.
The court dismissed both the due process and the open court
arguments on the basis that the Indiana Supreme Court in Dague
had held that there was no right in a plaintiff for the
continuation of a common law action which had not vested and the
legislature had the power to alter or abolish it.
10.

LOUISIANA

The Supreme Court of Louisiana in 1978 upheld its ten-year
statute of repose against charges that the statute offended equal
protection, due process, and a person1s right of access to the
court. In Bermaster v. Gravity Drainage District No. 2,
366 S.2d 1381 (La. 1978) the court found that there was a
reasonable classification between persons performing or
furnishing the design, planning and supervision of construction
from the owners or tenants who later take control. Likewise, not
including suppliers and manufacturers of building materials was
also not a violation of equal protection since this group
manufactures goods in a controlled environment whereas
contractors and architects are limited in their ability to
pretest and standardize.
The court next addressed the contention that the statute
violated the due process clause of the federal and state
constitutions as well as the open court clause of the state
constitution. The court held that there was no vested property
right in the plaintiff since the right did not begin until the
death of the decedent which had occurred more than fifteen years
after the building was completed. The court concluded by stating
that the statute does not bar plaintiff's cause of action but
rather prevents what otherwise might be a cause of action from
ever arising.
11.

MARYLAND

In Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 499 A.2d 178
(Md. 1985) the Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld its ten-year
statute of repose by ruling that the statute did not violate
equal protection, was not a law for a special or individual case,
did not violate the "remedy" provision of the state constitution,
and did violate other local provisions of the state constitution.
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The court found a rational purpose in the legislation by
encouraging architects and engineers to experiment with new
designs and materials. In addition, it found that these
individuals were unable to monitor a building after it was
completed. The court also found that it was not unconstitutional
to separate suppliers of material and equipment from the
classification of architects and engineers.
12. MASSACHUSETTS
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Klein v. Catalano,
437 N.E.2d 514 (Mass. 1982) upheld its six-year statute of repose
and rejected claims that the statute violated equal protection,
due process, or the remedy by recourse of laws provision of the
state constitution. The court found the statute did not violate
due process since no person has a vested interest in any rule of
law entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for
his benefit. Since the accident in this case occurred eight
years after the statute's date the application of the statute did
not adversely affect any vested substantive right of the
plaintiff.
The court found a rational basis for enacting the statute to
eliminate stale claims, and to prevent claims from being brought
where evidence was no longer available to either party. The
court noted that it may disagree with the philosophy of the
legislature but that it was not its role to question it as long
as there was a rational basis. The court stated, "The
legislature could reasonably conclude that the statistical
improbability of meritorius claims after a certain length of
time and the inability of the courts to adjudicate stale claims
weigh more heavily than allowing the adjudication of a few
meritorius claims." Id. at 521, fn. 11.
As to the remedy provision of the state constitution the
court acknowledged that the statute abolished a cause of action
without providing an alternate remedy. The court upheld the
statute on the basis that it was rationally related to a
permissible legislative objective. The court also observed that
while in some cases the statute may impose great hardship on a
plaintiff who has suffered injury and who has a meritorious claim
the arguments as to hardship are appropriate for legislation and
not for court interpretation. Id. at 522. The court upheld
the equal protection attack on the basis that the classification
was reasonable.
13.

MICHIGAN

The Supreme Court of Michigan in 1980 upheld its six-year
statute of repose in O'Brien v. Hazelet and Erdal, 299
N.W.2d 336 (Mich. 1980). The Supreme Court of Michigan rejected
the argument that the statute violated due process by barring a
cause of action before it arose. The court stated, "If the
Legislature can entirely abrogate a common law right, surely it
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may provide that a particular cause of action can no longer arise
unless it accrues within a specified period of time." Id. at
341. The court also upheld the statute based upon equal
protection finding that the classification of engineers and
architects was reasonable even though contractors and materialmen
were excluded.
14.

MINNESOTA

In Calder v. City of Crystal, 318 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1982)
the court upheld the Minnesota fifteen-year statute of repose.
In doing so it distinguished its 1977 decision of Pacific
Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeqer, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn.
1977) which held an earlier version of the statute to be
unconstitutional. The court concluded that the amended statute
did not offend equal protection since the classification of
individuals by the legislature was reasonable.
The court also upheld the statute based upon federal and
state due process clauses as well as a remedy of injury clause in
the state constitution. The court recognized the principle that
the legislature could constitutionally eliminate a common law
right without a reasonable substitute if it is pursuing a
permissible and legitimate legislative objective.
15.

MISSISSIPPI

In Anderson v. Fred Wagner & Roy Anderson, Jr. Inc.,
402 So.2d 320 (Miss. 1981) the Supreme Court held the statute of
repose limiting to ten years the liability of persons involved in
the design, plan, supervision and construction of real property
did not violate the state constitutional provision guaranteeing
access to the courts nor was it an unconstitutional special or
local law. The court reviewed the various decisions throughout
the country both upholding and striking down these type of
statutes but concluded that the decisions findings these statutes
were a legitimate exercise of legislative power were more
persuasive and thereby upheld the Mississippi statute. The court
rejected the contention that plaintiffs had been denied access to
the courts and stated that there is no vested right in any
remedy for torts yet to happen and except as to vested rights the
state legislature has full power to change or abolish existing
common law remedies and methods of procedures. Id. at 324.
16.

MONTANA

The Supreme Court of Montana in Reeds v. Ille Electric
Co. , 551 P.2d 647 (Mont. 1976) upheld its ten-year statute of
repose. The court held that the statute did not violate the
access to the court provision of the state constitution, the
federal and state constitutional provisions for equal protection
and due process, as well as several other state constitutional
provisions. The court reviewed the history of the Montana
Constitution which provides that courts of justice shall be open
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to every person and speedy remedy afforded. After reviewing
several older cases interpreting this provision the court stated,
"Assuming arguendo, that plaintiff would have a claim under
common law, the legislature is not constitutionally prohibited
from eliminating a common law right . . . . [T]he legislature did
not interfere with any vested right of plaintiff, but simply cut
off accrual of the right to sue after ten years." Id. at 651.
The court also in addressing the due process argument of the
plaintiff held that an alterate remedy had in fact been provided
to the plaintiff by allowing the plaintiff to sue the owner,
tenant, or person in actual possession of the improvement at the
time the cause of action arose. The court stated, "The plain
words of Section 93-2621 refute the implication of plaintiff's
argument that he is without a remedy." Id. at 652.
17.

NEW JERSEY

In an early case relied upon by many later state courts, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey in Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen,
293 A.2d 662 (N.J. 1972) upheld a constitutional attack on New
Jersey's ten-year statute of repose. The court held that the
effect of the statute is not to bar a cause of action but rather
to prevent what might otherwise be a cause of action from
arising. The court further held that the statute did not violate
the equal protection clauses of the state or federal
constitution
18.

NEW MEXICO

The Court of Appeals of New Mexico in Howell v. Burk,
568 P.2d 214 (N.M. App« 1977) affirmed a ten-year statute of
repose. The court noted the historical reasons for enacting the
statute which was to limit the exposure of builders and other
persons in the building occupation after decisions had judicially
expanded liability of these persons. The court found that as to
the claim of equal protection there was a reasonable
classification between the groups of individuals covered by the
statute and those that were excluded.
The court rejected the claim that the statute violated due
process since it prevented plaintiff's cause of action before it
had arisen. Relying upon the New Jersey case of Rosenberg v.
Town of North Bergen, the court agreed with the New Jersey court
in its finding that the legislature is empowered to prevent a
cause of action from arising prior to the injury of the
plaintiff. The court also noted it is not the function of the
judicial system to determine social or economic policy which
underlie the statute but rather is to determine whether the
statute is unconstitutional.
19.

NORTH CAROLINA

The North Caroline Supreme Court in Lamb v. Wedgewood

South Corp., 302 S.E.2d 868 (N.C. 1983) upheld the
constitutionality of its six-year building statute. The court
found that the classification of the various groups that were
covered or not covered by the statute was reasonable and declared
that the overwhelming majority of courts throughout the country
have sustained these type of statutes based upon equal protection
grounds.
The court addressed the open court argument as to a North
Carolina provision essentially identical to Utah's. The court
cited the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the
Louisiana Supreme Court, and the Mississippii Supreme Court. The
court in noting that the remedy provision of the state
constitution was qualified by the words "due course of law"
stated that this phrase meant the remedy must be one that is
legally cognizable. "The legislature has the power to define the
circumstances under which a remedy is legally cognizable and
those under which it is not." The court also observed that since
the plaintiff's cause of action had not accrued at the time the
legislation was passed nc vested right was involved.
In 1985 the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the
constitutionality of the statute of repose relating to product
liability cases. Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co., 332 S.E.2d 67
(N.C. 1985). The court in referring to the Lamb decision
noted that the statute of repose in Tetterton was designed to
eliminate the possibility of manufacturers being indefinitely
liable for products that were sold. The court concluded that the
reasoning in Lamb was applicable to the product liability case
and that the open court provision was therefore not violated.
20.

OHIO

The Court of Appeals of Ohio in Elizabeth Gamble
Deaconess Home Assn. v. Turner Constr. Co., 470 N.E.2d 950 (Ohio
App. 1984) upheld its fifteen-year statute of repose. The court
observed that due process was not violated by the passage of this
statute since the legislature may abolish as well as create
substantive rights of recovery. The court stated, "Due process
may be violated if it is demonstrated that the legislation cannot
be supported on any rational basis of fact that can reasonably be
conceived to sustain it. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate
that there is no rational basis for this statute of repose."
Id. at 957.
The court listed the various states which had upheld or
rejected similar statutes and stated that it was persuaded by the
reasoning of the Colorado Supreme Court and the Michigan Supreme
Court and therefore aligned itself with that rule.
That same year the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, Dykes, Goodenberger,
Bower & Clancy, 740 F.2d 1362 (6th Cir. 1984) upheld the same
statute on several constitutional grounds including the access to

A-30

the court provision nearly identical to Utah's. The court
observed that the open court provision of the Ohio Constitution
was the equivalent of the due process clause of the Fouteenth
Amendment. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that
legislatures do not violate federal due process rights by
creating statutes of repose that prevent causes of action from
accruing. "A litigant has no vested property right in a cause of
action until it accrues." The court then quoted the United
States Supreme Court decision in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) recognizing this
principle.
The Federal Circuit Court noted that the provision of the
Ohio Constitution guarantees a "remedy by due course of law" for
"an injury done", but that state law determines what injuries are
recognized and what remedies are available. It noted that the
Ohio courts have never held that the open court provision in its
constitution prevents the legislature from abolishing a cause of
action.
The court upheld the statute on the basis of equal
protection stating that the distinctions made within the statute
were legally justified. It distinguished the reasons for giving
protection to an architect or engineer and not to an ower or
tenant. The court concluded by stating as long as the
classifications are rational and not arbitrary the requirements
of equal protection are satisfied.
21.

OREGON

In Josephs v. Burns, 491 P.2d 203 (Or. 1971) the
Oregon Supreme Court upheld its ten-year statute of repose based
upon an attack that the statute was unconstitutional because it
violated the Oregon remedy by due course of law clause of the
state constitution. The court in rejecting this argument
concluded that the state constitution did not inhibit the
legislature from altering common law rights. The court stated:
It has always been considered a proper function of
legislatures to limit the availability of causes of
action by the use of statutes of limitation so long as
it is done for the purpose of protecting a recognized
public interest. It is in the interest of the public
that there be a definite end to the possibility of
future litigation resulting from past actions. It is a
permissible constitutional legislative function to
balance the possibility of outlawing legitimate claims
against the public need that at some definite time there
be an end to potential litigation. Id. at 208.
22.

PENNSYLVANIA

In one of the leading cases in this area of law the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that its twelve-statute of repose
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did not violate the open court and remedy provision of the state
constitution. In Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork
Co., 382 A.2d 715 (Pa. 1978) the court disagreed with the
plaintiff that the legislature was required to substitute another
means of redress before a right of action existing at common law
could be eliminated. The court stated that no one has a vested
right in the continued existence of a body of negligence law.
The court said, "The practical result of a contrary conclusion
would be the stagnation of the law in the face of changing
societal conditions." Id. at 720. The court also made the
following comments which have been widely utilized by other
courts in interpreting their state constitutions. The court
stated:
This Court would encroach upon the Legislature's
ability to guide the development of the law if we
invalidated legislation simply because the rule enacted
by the Legislature rejects some cause of action
currently preferred by the courts. To do so would be to
place certain rules of the "common law" and certain
non-constitutional decisions of courts above all change
except by constitutional amendment. Such a result would
offend our notion of the checks and balances between the
various branches of government, and of the flexibility
required for the healthy growth of the law. Id. at
721.
The court upheld the statute on equal protection grounds
based upon a number of distinctions between owners and builders.
The court also found that the classification between builders and
suppliers of building materials was rational and therefore
constitutional.
23.

RHODE ISLAND

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island handed down two decisions
relating to the constitutionality of the product liability
statute of repose and the building statute of repose. In the
first case, it held the statute to be unconstititutional. In the
second, it held the statute to be constitutional.
In Kennedy v. Cumberland Engineering Co., Inc., 471
A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984) the court examined the relationship betwen
the remedy clause of the state constitution and a statute which
prevented an action to be maintained for a defective product ten
years after the product was first purchased. The court stated:
To prohibit court access absolutely for a generally
recognized claim to a class of plaintiffs merely because
they were injured by a product more than ten years old
not only is irrational, in our opinion, but also flies
in the face of even minimal constitutional protection
mandated by Article I, Section 5. Id. at 198.
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The court concluded that the remedy provision had been
violated since product liability claimants injured by products
more than ten years old were left with no forum in which to bring
their claim. The court stated, HIf the constitutional guaranteed
of right of access to the courts is to have any meaning, this
statute must be struck down." Id. at 199.
The following year the Supreme Court of Rhode Island dealt
with the constitutionality of the building statute of repose.
Walsh v. Gowinq, 494 A.2d 543 (R.I. 1985). The plaintiff in
this case attempted to dismiss the appeal on the basis of the
Kennedy decision. The court denied the motion to dismiss and
directed the parties to brief and argue the constitutionality of
the ten-year building statute. The court observed that the
building statute had been passed as a result of a Rhode Island
decision eliminating privity of contract as a requirement to
maintain an action against a builder.
The court in distinguishing the Kennedy decision noted
that in Kennedy all remedies of the purchaser had been
eliminated. On the other hand, the court cited an Illinois
decision which interpreted the Illinois statute of product
liability repose. There, the statute denied a plaintiff the
right to a strict liability action but still permitted a
negligence action to be made available. The court then observed
a prior decision in which it allowed a statute to eliminate the
liability of a charitable hospital but required that employees
thereby be individually liable to the plaintiff. The Rhode
Island court noted that this statute did not deprive the
plaintiffs of their day in court but instead "left the plaintiffs
with the remedy against agents or employees of the hospital who
were initial tort feasors." Id. at 547.
In using this same reasoning the Rhode Island Supreme Court
found that a remedy was still existing even though not against
the builder or architects of a building. The court stated.:
In the case before us, an improver of real property
will be subject to suit for ten years after its
structure has been substantially completed. Thereafter,
plaintiffs seeking damages can resort to the court for
redress injuries arising out of improvements to real
property against the owners or operators of that
improved property.
The judiciary, in abrogating the common law
doctrine of privity of contract, exposed architects,
engineers, and other improvers of real property to
unlimited potential liability to third parties. The
General Assembly responded by enacting Section 9-1-29 to
limit this exposure. In doing so, it acted well within
its constitutional authority. Id. at 548.
24.

TENNESSEE
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The Tennessee Supreme Court approved its relatively short
four-year building statute of repose in Harmon v. Agnus R.
Jessup Associates, Inc., 619 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1981). In
upholding the statute in light of the Tennessee open court and
remedy provision the court stated that the legislation was
reasonably related to the legislative concern and therefore it
was constitutional. The court found that a four-year period of
time was a sufficient period for the legislature to conclude that
injuries resulting from poor construction and design would have
occurred during this limitation. The court concluded by noting
that while there was a decided split of authority in other
jurisdictions regarding the validity of legislation the greatest
number of decisions have sustained these type of statutes.
Id. at 525.
25.

TEXAS

A series of cases decided by the Texas Court of Appeals have
upheld the constitutionality of the Texas ten-year statute of
repose. In Ellerbee v. Otis Elevator Co,, 618 S.W.2d 870
(Tex. App. 1981) the Court of Appeals interpreted its open court
and remedy provision. The court stated that this section of the
constitution "does not create any new right, but is a declaration
of a general fundamental principle that for such wrongs as are
recognized by the law of the land, the court shall be open and
afford a remedy." Id. at 873.
The court noted that neither the constitution of the United
States nor of Texas forbids the abolition of common law rights of
action in order to attain a permissible legislative object. The
court found the classification to be proper in excluding owners
and materialmen from the protection of the statute. It should be
observed that this case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court
which dismissed it for lack of a substantial federal question.
459 U.S. 802 (1982). The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized that
by dismissing for lack of a substantial federal question, it is
deciding a case on the merits. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S.
332 (1975) .
In 1983 the same Court of Appeals in Sowders v. M.W.
Kellogg Co,, 663 S.W. 2d 644 (Tex. App. 1984) reaffirmed the
Ellerbee decision and held that the statute did not violate
either federal or state due process or the right of access clause
of the Texas Constitution.
In 1985 a separate court of appeals again upheld the statute
on several claimed constitutional deficiencies. McCulloch v.
Fox & Jacob, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. App. 1985). The court
stated that since the United States Supreme Court had dismissed
the Ellerbee case for want of a substantial federal question
that this decision eliminated any claim of a deprivation of due
process or equal protection. The court then went on to address
the open court and remedy provision of the state constitution.
A-34

The court stated that a "cause of action does not vest until an
injury occurs; no one has a vested right in any common law rule,
and the right to bring a common law action is not a fundamental
right. Thus, the legislature may create new rights or abolish
old ones to attain a permissible legislative objective." Id.
at 924.
The court found sufficient legislative purpose in the
enactment of the statute to justify any constitutional attacks.
26.

WASHINGTON

In Yakima Fruit and Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating &
Plumbing Co. , 503 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1973) the court upheld a
constitutional attack upon the six-year statute of repose. The
court found that the statute did not violate the equal protection
clause of the United States Constitution and relied upon the
Oregon Supreme Court case of Josephs v. Burns.
27.

WISCONSIN

The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin in United States Fire Ins.
Co. v. E.D. Wesley Co., 301 N.W.2d 271 (Wis. App. 1980)
rejected plaintiff's claim of a violation of due process rights
contrary to the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions. The
court stated that no violation may occur until a vested property
right is in existence. Since the plaintiff had no vested
property right until the pipeline burst and the injury was
sustained there was no due process violation.
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H0US2 3ILL #4

(73-12-25.5)

TH2 RZADOG CLZZX;
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House Bill #4 by

Representatives Hill, Mecham and Redd:

An act enacting

a new section 78-12-25#5, Subsection *5, Utah Code
annotated 1953 relating to the limitations of action
for Injury to property or death must be brought against
persons who performed or furnished the design, planning,
supervision or construction of improvements on real
property*
Be It enacted by the Legislature of the
State of Utah:

Section 1.

Subsection *5«

Utah Code annotated 1953 is enacted to

read:

Section 78-12-25,

78-12-25 Subsection #5#

No action to recover

damages-for any injury to property, real or personal, or
for any injury to the person or for bodily injury of
wrongful death arising out of the defective and unsafe
condition of an improvement to real property, nor any
action for damages sustained on account of such injuries
shall be brought against any person performing or
furnishing the design, planningf- supervision of construction or construction of such improvement to real
property more than 4 years after the completion of
construction*

(1)

"Person" shall mean an individual,

corporation, partnership or any other legal entity.
(2)

Completion of construction shall mean that that
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t i n e when the l a s t s a t e r l a i has been furnished and the
l a s t labor performed Including a l l n e c e s s a r y small jobs
I n c i d e n t a l to the completion of c o n t r a c t u a l

obligations

and I n c i d e n t a l to making the Improvement s u i t a b l e for
I t s Intended u s e .

The l i m i t a t i o n Imposed by t h i s

p r o v i s i o n s h a l l not apply to any person in a c t u a l
p o s s e s s i o n and c o n t r o l as owner, t^enant or o t h e r w i s e of
the improvement at the time, the d e f e c t i v e and unsafe
c o n d i t i o n of such Improvement c o n s t i t u t e s the proximate
causa of the Injury for which i t Is proposed to bring an
action.

This p r o v i s i o n shall not be cmrjsrrued as

e x t e n d i n g or l i m i t i n g the periods otherwise p r e s c r i b e d by
the laws of t h i s State for the bringing of any a c t i o n .
Mr. Speaker:

Your Committee on Business

and Commerce to which was referred House 3111 #4 by
Rep. H i l l e t a l , l i m i t a t i o n of c e r t a i n a c t i o n s has
c a r e f u l l y considered said b i l l and reports the same out
f a v o r a b l y with the following amendments:

Page 1, l i n e 10,

a f t e r the word, "than11 delete the word "four" and add the
word

n

3^venif.

Repeat:

Page I,

l i n e 10, a f t e r the word

"than" d e l e t e the word "four" and add the word "seven".
R e s p e c t f u l l y , Representative Frank V. Nelson, Chairman.
TH£ CHAIR:

Mr. Speaker, I move we adopt the

committee r e p o r t .
A-38
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THZ CHAIR:

It has been moved and seconded to

adopt the committee report.
All in favor, say aye.
no.

Committee report is adopted.

(aye)

Opposed say

House 3111 #4 is

before you and the Chair will recognize the chief
sponsor of the Bill.
REP. HILL:

Representative Hill.

Before we get too far into this, there

has been passed an amendment which we propose to make' in
the beginning of line 14.

This amendment was written up

before we had the new line delineations on the Bill, and
so the top two lines are a little bit in error.

But the

amendment is to begin, will replace the subsection 2,
beginning at line 14, with the information that is going
to be passed out just prior to the convening time at
2 o'clock.

Delete that entire paragraph there and replace

it with the one written, "Completion of construction for
the purposes of this act,shall mean the date of issuance
of a Certificate, of substantial completion by the owner,
architect, engineer or other agents, or the date of the
owner's use or possession of the improvement on real
property•"
THS CHAIR:

It's been moved and seconded that we

amend House Bill #4 by replacing subsection 2 with the
new subsection as just read.

All in favor of the motion
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1

!

say aye.

2

i

is

3

II

* II

(aye)

amended,
a2

Opposed say n o .

So o r d e r e d .

The

Bill

2.ap r e s e s a c i v e H i l l .

- " SILL:

The reason f o r t h i s i s t o g e t a

little

a o r a c l e a r aeaning of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r p h r a s e . " c o m p l e t i o n
of c o n s t r u c t i o n " ,

as opposed t o t h e one t h a t was w r i t t e n ,

o r i g i n a l l y w r i t t e n in the B i l l .

We have a more or

less

r e c o g n i s e d p r i n c i p l e of law - - I'm n o t a l a w y e r , I g u e s s
8 ||

I s h o u l d n ' t be speaking for a l l these.l-a-vyers - -

but

9

t h e r e i s a r e c o g n i z e d p r i n c i p l e of law t h a t h o l d s

that

10

a t some p o i n t t h e r e i s a n e c e s s i t y f o r a t i m e t o be

U

e s t a b l i s h e d when r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s must be s e t t l e d .

12
13
14
15
16
IT
IS

Now t h i s i s r e c o g n i z e d i n the f a c t

t h a t we have many

s t a t u t e s of l i m i t a t i o n s d e f i n e d by s t a t u t e and law t h a t
s t a t e s t h a q a c t i o n i n c e r t a i n c a u s e s and c e r t a i n

cases

must be brought b e f o r e a c e r t a i n d a t e .

There i s a l i m i t

beyond w h i c h a c t i o n cannot be b r o u g h t .

Well,

v e r y sound and p r a c t i c a l p r i n c i p l e and i t ' s

this is a

a l s o a good

b u s i n e s s p r i n c i p l e because at some t i m e t h e r e must be a

19

p o i n t a t w h i c h o b l i g a t i o n s are c o n s i d e r e d s e t t l e d .

If

20

y o u ' v e aada an e r r o r or y o u ' v e aade a a i s t a k e ,

as a

21

n a t u r a l c o u r s e , t h e y ' r e n o t h e l d a g a i n s t you f o r e v e r

in

22

acst cases.

However, i n the e n g i n e e r i n g and

tural field

t h i s i s not s o , as d e f i n e d so f a r

architec-

23
24

definition

i n t h e s t a t u t e s are c o n c e r n e d .
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1 !j The work chaC an engineer, an architect or contractor
2 | or supervisor performs by statute can be held against
3

him for his entire life, and in some cases, have been

4

brought against the estate of the man after he is

5

deceased*

6 I

Now it's recognized that that are some things

7

that might enter intp this from the standpoint that if

8

you take away some —

9

if you give rights in one place,

II then you have to take them away from some other place*

10

This is probably so, but you must make, you must

11

determine then, which will be for the good and best of

12

all concerned*

13

it's been brought to our attention across the nation

14

that it seems like we've become a suit-conscious people

15

to the extent that when an action is brought, . everyone

16

that had any connection with it, even sometimes down to

IT

the janitor, have been entered in as a party to the

13

suit*

19
20

Now in this particular matter we have,

This has been true of many engineering firms and

many engineering and architectural people where action
has been brought years and years after they have completed
their service, the facility has been in use and a cause
for at least proposed negligence has been brought and

23

the person who is responsible for the construction of

i

I the building in the original instance has been named as
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a party Co Che s u i t .
2

Usually t h e s e have been able to

be cleared buc not u n t i l much time and energy has been

i

3 jl

extended en Che part of chat person chac was responsible

4

f o r chac design.

5

Sow, Che face ehac ac some time chis cuCoff

6 I

should be i s recognized a l s o i n Che Court because in
some i n s t a n c e s , in any kind of a s u i t , i f ehe matter i s

8 II

too long past, t h e y ' l l d i s m i s s i t because i t f s a s t a l e

9

case*

Witnesses, memories, records are so far in the

10 I

time pasc Chac i c f s d i f f i c u l t t o e s t a b l i s h ceseimony, Co

ll

e s t a b l i s h some of Che things chac might be necessary for

12 ||

a Court determination in t h e s e , and these have been

13

dismissed on t h i s f a c t because they ruled ehera had been

14

as a maeter of equity in j u s t i c e no attempts to rule on

IS

those.

16

b i t d i f f e r e n t area i n our l e g a l f i e l d , i n the fact that

IT

most actions s t a r t from the time Chey have been discovered

IB

or could have been d i s c o v e r e d .

19

tion.

20

s t a r t from ehe time chac Che f a c i l i t y i s completed or

21

has been turned over to ehe owner or u s e r , whoever ehe

22

work was being performed f o r .

23

w r i t t e n up for four y e a r s , which i s a u s u a l , which has

*4

il

i

So Chis B i l l , while i t does gee i n t o a l i t t l e

This i s ehe usual l i m i t a -

This 3111 says that the a c t i o n or l i m i t a t i o n s h a l l

The o r i g i n a l 3 i l l is

i

been done in manj other States but we re willing to go
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with this 7-year program
in others9 it is less.
new.

In some States it's nore and

How this type of proposal is not

We have many States that have enacted similar

legislation recognizing the problem that is created by
having people on the hook, so to speak, for their entire
lifetime*

I111 list yon briefly the ones that have

enacted statutes in this same area: Idaho, Illinois,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Hew Hampshire, North Carolina,
Ohio, Tennessee, Virginia and Wisconsin.

Idaho being

the last, they passed one at their last Special Session
just a year ago*. And so we're asking for this consideration to the people that are involved in the construction
and design business that this type of thing might be
enacted*

I think Mr. Mecham, Representative Mecham,

has some other areas to bring in on the legal side of
the thing and an explanation of the "why" of this Bill*
I'd entertain any questions and any answer concerning
questions that may be in the minds of some of Che
representatives on the floor.
TEZ CHAIR;

Is there a question?

(Inaudible)
Rep. Arbuckle?
REJ. AR3UCXLZ:

Representative Hill will yield to

a question?
A-43
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REP. HILL:

Yes,

REP. AR3UCKLE:

sir.
You were m e n t i o n i n g some of

o t h e r S t a t e s t h a t have e n a c t e d t h i s type ox

legislation.

What i s the l e n g t h of t i n e most of them have f o r
t i m e t h e y ' r e held a c c o u n t a b l e
REP. HILL:

the

for?

I can read t h o s e .

at 9 years; I l l i n o i s

these

Idaho s e t

theirs

at 6 y e a r s ; Lousiana a t 10;

M i n n e s o t a 10; New Hampshire, 6 ; North C a r o l i n a 6;
Ohio 10; Tennessee 4 ; V i r g i n i a 5; and W i s c o n s i n 6 .
So we 1 r e about i n t h e same a r e a .
REP. AR3UC5LE:
THE CHAIR:
House B i l l 4?

No f u r t h e r

Are you r e a d y f o r the q u e s t i o n on

Representative

REP. SIMPSON:
THE CHAIR:

questions.

Simpson.

W i l l Rep. H i l l y i e l d to a q u e s t i o n ?

R e p r e s e n t a t i v e H i l l w i l l you submit

to a question?
REP. HILL:

Yes.

REP. SIMPSON:

In r e f e r e n c e t o o t h e r a g e n t s , would

t h e s e be other a g e n t s of t h e owner or t h e a r c h i t e c t

or

t h e e n g i n e e r , the way t h i s has been w r i t t e n ?
REP. HILL:

Well,

the owner i n some c a s e s can have

a s u p e r i n t e n d i n g , a c o n s t r u c t i o n s u p e r v i s o r who would be
a u t h o r i z e d to do t h i s . T h i s would be agent or e i t h e r .
So anyone - - someone would be a u t h o r i z e d t o make a
A-44
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signature regarding this certificate of completion.
REP. SIMPSON:
THZ CHAIR:

May I question further, Mr* Speaker?

State your question*

REP. SIMPSON:

Say the biggest difficulty was :-•

between the ovner and the engineer that the engineer's
agents release the engineer fron this contention?
THE CHAIR:

Rep. Hill?

REP. HILL:

Let me clarify the one point concerning

this completion of construction.

This is a standard

document used in the construction trade but not always,
and just merely recognises that the facility has been
completed*

This doesn't relieve anyone from any action.

It just indicates that the facility has been completed
according to whatever prearranged agreement was made
and that certain works has now concluded.
RZP. SIMPSON:
THZ CHAIR:

One final question, if I may.

State your question.

RZP. SIMPSON:

Have you ever known,Representative

Hill, of a case where an ovner got fed up, shall we say,
in waiting for these people to finish his home, and by
necessity because his other home had been sold, had to
move into this new and uncompleted home and this then
would cut him off?
THZ CHAIR: Representative Hill.
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R£?. HILL:

There are probably soae circumstances

involving t h i s that are surely true, to the extent
3 jl

that a contractor and owner relationship i s probably

*

not on f i r s ground in the beginning, where perhaps this

5

II could be.

The mere fact that he has taken prossession

would indicate that soae other arrangeaents had been

6

sade, I would presuae, but I don't think we could cover
8

II a l l of those situations by this particular

9
10

TEZ CHAIR:
1 House B i l l 4?

11
12
13

u

statement.

Are you ready for the question on

Rep. Carr.

a£P. CARR:

Will Representative H i l l yield?

II

THZ CHAIR:

Will you subnit the question'

"

R2P. HILL:

I will.

az?. CARR:

I had a couple of questions.

II

As I

13

understaad the B i l l , the-7-year statute of

16

would apply, regardless of the question of when the

17

defective condition was discovered.

liaitations

13

RE?. HILL:

This is correct.

19

az?. CARR:

How as I understand, I'm. not well

20

acquainted with a statute of this type, but I understand

21

that in soae States, some of the laws provide that the
tine runs from the discovery of the defect or when i t

23

*24

!l

ccmes to light?
RZ?. HILL:

This is the usual pattern of action
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limitations as I understand it.

This is a departure

from that pattern*
REP. CARS.:

Well, as I read the last paragraph,

the next to last paragraph, as I understand, the limitation does not apply to the person in actual possession
at the time the building was cons true ted •
RE?. KILL:

The time any action might be brought

REP. CARR:

Well suppose ••

REP. HILL:

Is in actual possession at the time

forth*

the defective or unsafe condition of such improvement
was discovered.
RE?.*CARR:

Well how do you interpret that?

That's the thing I f m getting at.
REP. HILL:

The purpose of that particular

statement was the fact that if action, as I understand
it —

as I say Ifm no lawyer «

against —

but if action was brought

by someone who was injured on some property

because of an unsafe condition, if he didn f t state that
the owner was not exempted by this provision, then he
would be scot-free.

It might be due to his negligence

on his part, but the 3111 would preclude the addition
of the engineer, designer or contractor as a third
party to the suit, additional par^ias.

But the owner
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would s t i l l — anyone would s t i l l have a c t i o n against
the owner or the one who had p o s s e s s i o n or control of
the property at the tine t h i s unsafe c o n d i t i o n say have
caused a problem*
1 2 2 . CARS.:

Well, back to t h i s question of the tim

t h e d e f e c t i s discovered*

I 1 si not an engineer, and I

d o n f t — i t seems to axe that i t might be • - I think
t h e r e should be a s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s on t h i s type of
a c t i o n because - - there should be l i m i t a t i o n on every
kind or most every kind of cause of a c t i o n or l e g a l
l i a b i l i t y , but I wonder about, i f you're not giving the
p u b l i c a l i t t l e more p r o t e c t i o n i f you don f t provide in
t h e r e , i f you should not provide that a l i m i t a t i o n period
run from the time the defect i s d i s c o v e r e d •

I wonder

what the committee, what your t h i n k i n g on that was, for,
i n s t a n c e i f you shorten the period from 7 years to say
2 years or 3 from the time the d e f e c t or f a u l t y condition
was a c t u a l l y discovered?
RZP. HILL:

As I understand i t , the present

s t a t u t e would apply on that b a s i s , and t h i s law i s
asking for a departure from that i n that the l i m i t a t i o n
would begin from the time of the completion of the
services.

How, t h i s i s net c o m p l e t e l y without precedent,

although i t i s a new concept as far as the General
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Statute of Limitations is concerned.
REP. CARS.: As I understand it, I'm sorry to take
so much time —
4

REP. HILL:

This is all right, Representative Carr.

5

REP. CARS.: As I understand, if the defect or if

6

the injury, if the building for instance, collapsed

m
i

8 years after construction, under this statute there

8

would be no liability*

9

REP. HILL:

There would be no liability to the

10

engineer or the contractor; the owner would still be

11

held liable.

12
13

REP. CARR:

There would be no liability to the

owner, the engineer or the architect contractor?

14

REP. HILL:

Right*

Unless of course, a fraud,

15

these type of things would still hold I'm sure, if

16

there had been some other factors that could enter into

17

this.

13

would preclude primarily any of these third party

19

propositions.

20

little further, if 1 may. We feel that there is a tine

I donft believe he's relieved scot-free, but this

1 might clarify this one thing just a

21

testing of the design capabilities of the design that

22

has been furnished, and if there are any major errors

23
24

or omissions, the team of the designer, the owner and
the contractor should be able to uncover any major ones,

Page

U

1

such as you 1 re a l l f a m i l i a r w i t h , the one concerning

2

the Savings & Loan 3 u i l d i n g on Main Street*

3

|

The error

there in the combination of things that entered i n t o i t

4

showed up immediately because they had some bean f a i l u r e s .

5

This type of thing, the f i g u r e or main thing that the

8

II 7-year period i s a t i n e t e s t of anything that could be
of s i g n i f i c a n c e .

8

There might be some minor, I don't

jj t h i n k any of us are p e r f e c t .

When you say that anything

9

would be p e r f e c t after p a s s i n g a 7-year period, but we

10

f e e l that the 7-year time t e s t i s adequate to p r o t e c t

II

the public in t h i s case and g i v e repose and r e l i e f

12

the p e a c e f u l a t t i t u d e of the designer who knows not now

13

h e f s held forever for that d e s i g n and can be brought i n

U

as part of the s u i t should one occur*

15
16
IT
IS

R£P.

CARR:

TH2 CHAIR:

to

Thank you.
Thank you Rep. Hill.

Rep* Wheeler, do

you have something youfd like to add?
RZP. VHZZLZR:

Ifd just like to add, Mr. Speaker,

19

as a member of that committee, we discussed this with
20

Rep. Mecham and it came into question of fraud or
21

criminal negligence and it was his -• as I understand
22

the interpretation, that this wouldn't eliminate any
23

charges of fraud and criminal negligence in the design
24

of the building.

That comes under a separate statute,
A-50
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1 I is chat right9 &ep« Mac ham?
2

3.Z?. MECHAM:

3

TEZ CHAI3.:

*

That is correct•
Are you ready for the question?

Any question on House Bill *4? The Chief

5

Cleric will call the roll on House Bill 4,

S

THZ CHI2F CLZRX:

Aagard (aye); Anderson, G.T«.(aye)

1

Anderson, R«Ce (aye); Arbuckle (aye); Bagley (aye);

8

Behunin (aye); Benson (no); Bittner (aye); Brady (aye);

9

Bronson (aye); Brough (aye); Buhler (aye); Cannon (aye);

10

Carling (no); Christens (yes); Cox (aye); Darger (aye);

11

Day (aye); Dennis (aye); Drake (aye); Eskelsen, (aye);

12

Fisher (aye); Fowler (aye); Frost (Inaudible); Gllman.

13

THZ CHAIR:
II

Rep # Gilman wishes to explain his vote,

*

w

£ 5 ? . GILMAH:

Mr. Speaker, I t h i a k i t would be

15

nice if

t h e y ' d f o r g i v e a l l our m i s t a k e s i a 7 y e a r s ,

but

16

1 d o n ' t t h i n k t h e y s h o u l d be any more e x c u s e d than t h e

1"

r e s t of a s .

I vote no.

18

TH2 CHAI3.:

Representative Gilaan votes no.

19

THZ CHIZ7 CL22Z:

Ealladay ( a y e ) ; Halverson

2°

Harding ( i n a u d i b l e ) ; Harvard (yes);

21

Hodgkinson ( a o ) ; H o l t ( a y e ) ; Hunter ( a y e ) ; I n k l e y

—

J a c k ( y e s ) ; Jones ( y e s ) ; Knowlton ( a y e ) ; Leatham ( y e s ) ;

23

L i n g a r d ( a y e ) ; L o v e r i d g e (j^s);

2

Hill

(aye);

Ludvig

* I Mather ( n o ) ; Mechaa ( y e s ) ; M i t c h e l l

(yes);
(aye);

(no);

(aye); Nialsoa

(no);

Page 16
Hielson (aye); Oberhansley (yea); Pace (nal; Petersen
<7es); Plane (inaudible); Powell (yes); Preece (yes);
Redd (aye); Reese (aye); Regis (aye); Russell (inaudible);
Sanders (aye); Savage (79s);

Smith (no); Scone (no);

Suasion (yes); Th.eur.2r (yes); Thurston (yes);
Wheeler (yes); Whiting (aye); Wilkinson (no); Williams
(no); Young (aye).
Mr. Speaker (aye),
TH2 CHAIR:

(Pause)

House Bill #4 having received

53 yes votes, 12 no votes, 4 absent and not voting, has
received a constitutional majority.

(Pause)

H.3. #4 having received 53 votes, 12 no votes,
4 absent and not voting, has received its constitutional
majority and should be transmitted to the Senate for
their further action. The Reading Clerk will now read
House Bill #38.
SZHATS
(inaudible) Nest 53-12-25.5

(inaudible)

(inaudible)
The amendment we got to the committee (inaudible)
i all in favor say aye.

(aye)

Opposed?

Carried.

The

I House Amendments will be found on the 25th day in the
1

II

! House Journals, 25th day in the House Journals, page 13.
! House 3111 H

(inaudible).

11

:

SS3A703 3CCX3Z2:

Mr. President?

II

1

?age 17

••

2

Senator 3uckner.
SENATOR 3UCZ:iZR:

Mr. President ve believe the

3

law that has been presented to you is one that provided

4

for a statute of limitations for an area of our industry

5

and our econocy that has not formerly been completely

6

covered by the lav.

7

some 15 or more laws that are of a limitation nature

8

covering broad groups of action.

9

specific statute offered for the reasonable protection

10

of building industry, contractors, subcontractors,

U

suppliers, engineers or architects and they're now liable

12

basically for a lifetime for these actions.

13

legislation provides liability for personal injury or
i!

'Utah statutes today include

However, there is no

And this

*

U

building defects to be brought by 5, 10, 20, 30, 50, to

15

100 years after the building basically has been completed,

16

In the interest of the 25 year old building, most of

17

those involved with design and construction, be they

18
19

deceased or retired, if retired, and they can be
completely innocent. They must, however, go through the

20

expense of defending any action *to prove their innocence.

21 I Building (inaudible)
time and therefore you

(inaudible)

23 II industry believes that (inaudible)

.

four years but

24 Ij are willing to accept the 7-year situation as being
A-5?

The
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consistent with other limitations.

May I without

prolonging debate just quickly point out to you that
our statute of limitations now provides six years for
acting on a written contract, four years for acts on
an oral contract and three years on trespass, injury
to property, fraud and estate, liability created by
statute, 7-year statute for repossession of real property.
So this is consistent with that.

I would point out to

you also that other states who have recently re-enacted
the statute of limitationsr

Idaho passed

9 years,

Illinois 6 years, Louisiana 10 years, Minnesota 10 years,
New Hampshire 6 years, North Carolina 6 years, Ohio 10
years, Tennessee 4 years, Virginia 5 years, and Wisconsin
6 years.

So this, again, would be consistent with that.

(tape fades) program has passed away, technically his
heirs could even be brought into an action where there
is no limitation based upon the fact that when people
sue for damages if a building has something happen to
it, they sue everyone they can get their hands on legally.
And this means the builder, the architect, the owner,
the former owner, and anyone they can legally sue.
Consequently, I think the 3ill is logical and consistent.
I would not want to prolong debate (inaudible^
that has a lot more information if the members of the
A-54
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1
2

body would
I

interest

3

like to go into

of

tine, I think

it further, but

in

that basically, M r .

19

the
President,

explains the b i l l .

4

T H Z CLZ3JC:

5

Bill

6

••

t

••

Any f u r t h e r

discussion on

House

#4?

(inaudible)
Are

7 o u ready for the question?

8

All those in favor

say aye

(aye).

Opposed?

9

Carried.

House Bill #4 having been read the second time,

10

the question is shall House Bill #4 be read the third

11

time?

12

..

&

Having received a constitutional majority and the

l4s

bill passes

Roll call.
House

(Inaudible)

Bill £4 shows

23 ayes, no n a y s , 5 a b s e n t .

and will be r e f e r r e d

to

(Inaudible)

15

16

•.

17

..

House Bill #4

18

..

House Bill #4 for discussion.

19

A r e you ready

20

aye.

21

II

having

House Bill # 4 .

22

passage.

23

•.

24

••
11

for the q u e s t i o n ?

(aye) Opposed?
been

(Inaudible)

read

those

Motion carried.

the third

The question

Ail

(Inaudible)

time and

in favor

House Bill #4

that's

the

final

is shall House Bill #4 pass?

(inaudible)
House

Bill #4 shows

a final passage, 13 ayes,
A-55

say
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1 j| no nays, 10 absent.

Having received a constitutional

2 II aajoritj, the bill passes and will be signed by the
3

jl President and the

(inaudible)

+ II after which it will be transmitted to the "House for
5 II the signature of the Speaker of the House
6
7
8
9
10

U
12
13
14
15
IS
IT
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
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1

||

STATS OF ILLINOIS

)
)

2 || COUNTY OF COOK

SS

)

34

J

II

OHN F. ROBERTSON, being first duly sworn,

5

on oath says that he was provided with a tape record-

6

ing of proceedings had in the matter of House Bill 4,

7

enacting a new Section 73-12-25.5, Utah Code Annotated

8

1953.

9

He further says that a transcript was pre-

10

pared front the said tape and that the foregoing is a

11

true and correct transcript of said tape, except for

12

portions indicated as inaudible, to the best of his

13

knowledge and belief.

14

-z. -z <£L

15
16

vZrf «~i - '

is

17 || SU3SCRI3ED AND SWORN TO
3EFORS MS THIS 19th DAY
18 II OF AUGUST, A.D. 1986.

20 || NOTARY PUBLIC, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
21
22
23
24
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As

the

Official

State Senate
relating
for

the

1967.

IN
Utah

and

Secretary

I do hereby certify
H.b. No. 4,

verification,

INSERTED
of

to

Officer

RED,
State

is

as

a TRUE

taken

from

Senate.

record

DAY

the

Utah

that the transcript

submitted

the

of

to our office

WITH

CORRECTIONS

official
38" -

recordings

FEBRUARY 15,

REGULAR SESSION OF THE 37th LEGISLATURE.

<r.
Sopnxa C. Buckaxller
Official
Officer
*
Sec.
of
the
Utah State Senate
My Commission e x p i r e s May 1, 1987
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HOUSZ BILL NO. 4

• THIRD READING CALENDAR ROLL CALL:
Aye
Aye
Aye
Aye
Aye
Aye
Aye
Aye
Aye
Absent
Aye
Aye
Aye
Absent
Aye
Aye
Aye
Aye
Aye
Aye
Aye
Aye
Absent
Aye
Absent
Absent
Aye
Aye

ALSOP
BARNETT
BROOC3AiTK
BUCKNER
BULLEN
BUNNELL
BURT
Burton
Call
C.R.' Clark
E.t. Clark
Clyde
Dean
Evans
Ferry
Gardner
Greenwood
Hardward
Jenkins
Leavitt
Mackey
Mantes
Pugh
Rees
Taylor
Welch
Yorgason
Mr. President
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APPENDIX VIII
CHART FROM REPORT OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AS REPORTED IN COMMENT,
"LIMITATION OF ACTION STATUTES FOR ARCHITECTS
AND BUILDERS—BLUE PRINTS FOR NON-ACTION",
XVIII CATHOLIC U.L.R. 361 (1969)

STUDY OF DISTRIBUTION OF CLAIMS
BY LENGTH OF TIME
Number of years after
completion of project
before claim is
brought
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Total

Number of
claims

Percentage of
claims

Cumulation
percentage
of claims

215
106
96
64
31
18
28
5
3
2
0
0
1
1
0

37.7
18.6
16.8
11.2
5.4
3.3
4.9
.8
.5
.4

37.7
56.3
73.1
84.3
89.7
93.0
97.9
98.7
99.2
99.6

.2
.2

99.8
100.0

570

100.0
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